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Abstract 
Liminality is an in-between space that, as for the teenager who is neither fully child nor 
adult, accompanies new norms, routines, and expectations while simultaneously 
remaining in flux. This paper explores the history of liminality, its presence in the 
literature, and then applies Victor Turner’s notion of liminality to various as-yet 
unexplored aspects of a hospital, its Intensive Care Unit, and life itself within this 
context. In this autoethnography, the author, an ICU nurse, identifies and describes such 
liminal spaces as the Code Blue where a patient is neither dead nor alive, the challenge of 
caring for patients for whom the nurse believes treatments to be futile, and the ways in 
which the nurse finds humour within a context of death. Fictional literature is employed 
throughout to demonstrate how liminality feels to the author, who invites the reader to 
look behind the hospital room curtain and see what the ICU nurse sees.   
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
“Stop that!” Will Turner’s mother snapped at him when he staggered home, 
howling in pain after being shot in the courthouse gun battle with the Howards. 
‘Die like a man, like your brother did!’ She belonged to a world so well 
acquainted with fatal gunshots that she had certain expectations about how they 
ought to be endured. Will shut his mouth, and he died. 
                                                  --Malcolm Gladwell, Outliers, 2008, p. 164 
My husband enjoys telling the story that his wife is a nurse when the listeners’ 
response goes something like, “aww, you must be very well looked after.” Their 
assumption is that nurses are nurturers, or generally more caring people. He tells them, 
not unkindly, “you obviously don’t know many nurses.” When I share this story with my 
own peers, they laugh knowingly. The unspoken notion is that nurses are not—at least, 
not necessarily—caring or nurturing. It is a common refrain among my colleagues: 
“Unless my husband or children are bleeding profusely, they get no sympathy from me!” 
Coming from a workplace where mortal injury is fairly commonplace, the ICU nurse has 
some insight about how sick (or not) their own loved ones really are. There is intimate 
knowledge of the body, its borders and limits, as well as what mortal injury looks like. 
Knowledge like this can make the nurse an other who must be guarded in her or his 
knowledge. There is a significant gap between “you don’t know from sick!” and “one 
time we had to perform emergency surgery at the bedside because there was no time to 
get the patient to the operating room, but it was too late and they died anyway,” and the 
latter comment cannot be uttered in random company without evoking a very 
uncomfortable silence or, conversely, awkward, unanswerable questions.  
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This kind of knowledge is difficult to classify—it is part of the nurse’s 
experience but remains unsharable, except with other nurses who have had similar 
experiences. There are “contradictory orientations” (Navon & Morag, 2004, p. 
2343), “in-between narratives” (Bruce et al., 2014, p. 35), and they are typical to 
liminal states.   
This thesis is an exploration of these liminal spaces—where they reside, how their 
inhabitants change and are changed by their experience. This existential space, neither 
here nor there, is where the participants (nurses and patients, specifically) forge and 
practice culture as they go. It is a space where things can flip: power, comedy, and 
tragedy. As a diver, I liken the liminal to coastal or cavern diving sites where fresh and 
salt water often mix—the phenomenon is called a halocline. If there is only one type of 
water, there can be clarity. However, when the two very different concentrations mix 
together, the water looks oily, broiling, and is disorienting when you are immersed: The 
flux and churning prevent focus. The ICU nurse operates within theoretical and physical 
margins, where similarly there is churning, flux, and unpredictability. I wish to examine 
this theoretical halocline, these liminal spaces, the borders where nurses reckon with 
“groundless incomprehensibility” (Bruce & Davies, 2005, p. 1340), where we are both 
witnesses and participants.  
In looking for a way to speak to the in-between space the nurse inhabits, I 
explained my thoughts to my Master’s supervisor, who recognized that when I was 
talking about exploring the physical and philosophical clefts between things, I was really 
talking about liminal spaces. I described these in-between zones to her not knowing how 
they fit or how to tie them together, but once I explored them through a lens of liminality, 
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I was surprised how snug a fit they were. During my research, I found one article (which 
also happens to be an autoethnography) which describes nurse culture as difficult to 
recognize (Adams, 2007). She describes the purpose of her paper as being, partly, “to 
present a collection of research methods that are useful tools in analyzing the largely 
invisible [emphasis added] influence of nursing culture” (p. 3). Through exploring 
liminality and how it fit with my nursing work, I discovered that there are multiple ways 
and multiple realms the nurse, the patient, and the patient’s family inhabit liminality 
together. In fact, the more I looked, the more liminal spaces I saw.  
This reminds me of the beginning of David Foster Wallace’s (2005) 
commencement address for a graduating class:  
There are these two young fish swimming along, and they happen to meet an 
older fish swimming the other way, who nods at them and says, “Morning, boys, 
how’s the water?” And the two young fish swim on for a bit, and then eventually 
one of them looks over at the other and goes, “What the hell is water?” (para 1) 
Nurse culture is difficult to examine because I myself am immersed within it but 
also because liminal spaces have rituals but paradoxically few rules. Practiced by nurses 
but influenced by others like patients, families, and doctors, all couched in our 
surrounding culture, “deep-seated” (Adams, 2007, p. 3), nursing culture has historically 
been largely unexamined. Adams quotes Suominen, Krovasin, and Ketola (1997): 
“Structures of nursing culture have so far remained very much unknown territory and are 
seldom discussed, either in practice or among nursing researchers” (p. 4). I aim to, in 
some way, change that. I would like to examine the water in which I am immersed, with 
the hope that there can be deeper and meaningful understanding.  
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Autoethnography on Liminality 
The autoethnography does not have a very long history and instead represents a 
more recent shift to include the researcher within the context of culture (Boylorn & Orbe, 
2014). Criticized for not conforming to traditional methods of research, and fueled, in 
part, by feminist theory, the autoethnography has been said to be the product of a more 
introspective anthropological movement attempting to include the viewer her or himself 
within the culture being explored, reckoning with anthropology’s heritage of potential 
exploitation and Othering (Young & Meneley, 2005), and as such having emancipatory 
potential (Peterson, 2015). 
I fully acknowledge, also, that this work is not exempt from other criticisms of the 
autoethnography—that it has potential to be narcissistic, self-absorbed, and self-
important, confirming one’s own biases by cherry-picking parallels and citations to 
support one’s way of thinking (Duncan, 2004). Duncan goes on: “With its use of self as a 
source of data, it has been criticized for being self-indulgent, introspective, and 
individualized” (p. 28). All true. However, I cannot separate my professional work from 
all the other aspects of my life. I end up connecting death, ambiguity, grief, absurdity, 
and levity to books by the likes of Kurt Vonnegut, Joseph Heller, Margaret Laurence, 
Paul Bowles, and others. Literature has been one way I have made sense of my own 
experiences, by seeing aspects of my own experience in a character. I believe that by 
showing what authors have written that I have connected deeply to, it may help to 
illustrate why I view a situation the way I do. I see literature as an artist’s interpretation 
of a scene or scenario that requires an acknowledgment of complexity. There may be no 
better way to capture the complexity of human relationships than through art, and while I 
                                                                                                                          5 
 
 
 
cannot profess to make art, I can shamelessly use literature to show what I mean. 
Through literature, I am making explicit links with my experiences in a this-looks-like-
that kind of way.  
Before I embarked on my journey to become a nurse, I completed a bachelor’s 
degree in English. I naively believed that once I had completed a degree, my school 
career would be complete and I would be offered a well-paying job with which I would 
be able to support my adult self. Instead, I got a job at a chain bookstore and was paid 
minimum wage. Once the holiday season was over, I was fired. I still used my employee 
card for discounts. But discounts were not going to get me anywhere, really. I still needed 
a job.  
Coming from a strong heritage of nurses (mother, grandmother, aunt, multiple 
great aunts, and even my then-future mother-in-law), I should have been proud to 
continue the line of care givers. Instead, however, I am ashamed to admit that I felt as 
though entering nursing school was a failure. I had aspirations of becoming a writer and 
never saw myself as someone’s handmaiden (obviously, I had no idea what nursing 
meant). It was only when I began my Master of Education that I even viewed writing 
about nursing as a possibility. My real point here is that even after working as a nurse for 
many years, I did not see myself as a nurse. The profession was never a calling, and I did 
not wish to spend any more time than was necessary with anyone who was sick. 
However, I was paid to do the job, I was employed at a hospital, and I filled in the blank 
line on documents such as a passport application with the words Registered Nurse. Yet I 
viewed myself as an imposter—and a lousy one at that. I tried to ignore my persistent 
cold sweat of fear when I would walk onto the ward, the yet-unidentifiable smells 
                                                                                                                          6 
 
 
 
creating a knot of nausea in my gut. Almost paralyzed with fear that I may harm 
someone, I could not forget that I was responsible for people’s lives. I tried to watch how 
my coworkers “did” nursing as seemingly easily as conjuring flowers from nothing by 
anticipating, communicating, providing, and advocating. I honestly did not believe I 
would ever learn how to do all of that. 
 I wonder now if my wish to understand what we do is based on my own 
persistent feeling of doubt in my understanding. Margaret Atwood’s (1982) quotation on 
writers from her book Dancing Girls resonates with me: “Everyone thinks writers must 
know more about the inside of the human head, but that’s wrong. They know less, that’s 
why they write. Trying to find out what everyone else takes for granted” (p. 71). Not that 
I saw myself as a writer, but that I did feel as though I knew less. Without years of 
experience like many of my coworkers, I had nothing to guide how to nurse. There was 
this new set of expectations I had never considered—I was unmoored from most of the 
things that I knew.  
I chose an autoethnography for my Master’s thesis because that’s how I found I 
was writing about my experience. I didn’t know how else to talk about it, and I wanted to 
write in such a way that the reader would see what I saw and understand why nursing 
baffled me. Why it still, in many ways, baffles me. It was a member of my committee 
who said, after reading the initial results of my progress, “So, it looks like you’re doing 
an autoethnography?” And I said: “I guess I am.” I thought I would be merely reporting 
and describing what I saw, making links with theory. What I learned was that I was 
processing my experiences through writing and making connections with not only theory 
but literature, and then in an ouroboric manner, connecting with my own experience 
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again with theory, and then reabsorbing my new learning, the circle continuing (and 
continuing still).  
I approached my thesis with the fullness of my ignorance, not knowing that by 
writing an autoethnography rather than a more data-collection-oriented method, I may 
have chosen a path that was rockier, deeper, with more unexpected moments of 
reflection, and difficult, personal epiphanies. These, I have learned, have also been 
attributed characteristics of the autoethnography—the learning-in-doing characteristics 
that are true for me as well (Ellis, Adams, & Bochner, 2011). Ellis (1999) also describes 
the autoethnographic journey as being potentially much more difficult than more 
traditional styles of research, particularly in the introspection and then sharing what one 
has found. I came across Ellis’s description of this kind of discovery in her retell of 
having a PhD student approach her, asking Ellis to be on her committee. The student was 
about to begin her thesis and wanted to study the experience of breast cancer survivors. 
Through their conversation, Ellis learns that the student is herself a breast cancer 
survivor, and knowing that, Ellis encourages the student to consider writing an 
autoethnography, weaving in her own experience with those of the women she wanted to 
participate. The student wonders out loud how difficult it may be to recount her own 
experience within her research. However, Ellis tells the student that emotionally, writing 
about one’s own experience is potentially very difficult, and warns: “There’s the 
vulnerability of revealing yourself, not being able to take back what you’ve written or 
having any control over how readers interpret it” (p. 672). I found this to be true as 
well—some of the things I describe in my work are a gamble. I have dug into the 
compost of my memories and found rich soil, but have had to stop and wonder, are my 
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memories offensive? I have to wonder if I have crossed an invisible line where my 
honesty reveals more than I want it to. I have asked myself, what am I revealing, exactly, 
and to what end?  Similarly, this was echoed by a committee member who fairly asked 
what my “So what?” was. I have a lot to say about nursing and how we do it, but indeed, 
so what? I puzzled over this for a long time, never quite finding an answer that felt true. 
Then I stumbled into Orwell’s essay Politics and the English Language (2013), when 
reading Steven Pinker’s (2014) The Sense of Style. Pinker notes how good writers avoid 
dehumanizing their subjects by personalizing and describing in such a way that ignites 
the text, allowing the reader intimate understanding, allowing the reader to see, in her or 
his mind’s eye, what is happening on a personal level. Orwell (1946/2013), in Politics 
and the English Language, urges the writer to beware “dehumanizing abstraction” (p. 
31), by employing euphemisms or descriptions so separated from their subject as to have 
lost any connection to their purpose. Orwell says,  
In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defence of the 
indefensible. Things like the continuance of British rule in India, the Russian 
purges and deportations, the dropping of the atom bombs on Japan, can indeed 
be defended, but only by arguments which are too brutal for most people to face, 
and which do not square with the professed aims of political parties. Thus 
political language has to consist largely of euphemism, question-begging and 
sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenceless villages are bombarded from the air, the 
inhabitants driven out into the countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts 
set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is called pacification. (p. 31)  
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I read this, and as the main character in The Mezzanine (Baker, 1988/2011) experiences 
when he reads something immensely satisfying: “the warped sound of a rinsed saucepan 
struck against the side of the sink ringing in my head” (p.124). What I discuss in this 
autoethnography, to me, is like this: There are euphemisms and allusions to what we do 
without ever having to use any explicit language. There are small islands of clarity 
surrounded by murky, swift-moving water; life-raft-sized areas of shared understanding 
in a gulf of shifting, unexplored, misunderstood space. “Codes” known by seemingly 
benign colours that belie their real purpose, secret languages known to medical staff 
alone, and situations that are shrouded to patients and their loved ones, and even to many 
medical staff other than nurses. A family member asks how his or her loved one is doing. 
The nurse answers but appears to be incredibly vague, noncommittal, and even seemingly 
glib when she answers incongruously lightly, “okay.” The patient is decidedly not okay, 
but there is too much to explain, the gulf between the family member and the nurse’s 
understanding of the context and expectations that the nurse’s answer becomes spare 
instead of probing, asking. Euphemisms and nebulous language for what occurs in 
liminal spaces can hold the nurse and the patient hostage within it, searching for a way to 
reconcile what the patient and family want (or simply understand) and what the nurse is 
bound to enact (often because of a lack of understanding). While not within the scope of 
this paper, perhaps it could even be suggested that even our nebulous language is a 
symptom or manifestation of a liminal state.  
The notion of liminality fits (however unintentionally) with an autoethnographic 
approach because the entire theory of liminality is based on the notion that in-between 
spaces are reciprocal and consist of navigated relationships and rituals between members 
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of a culture. There is the culture of a place—in this case, an ICU—where the inhabitants 
are not only recipients of that culture but contribute to it as well. I contribute to it as a 
nurse in the ICU. I am also the autoethnographer imprinted with culture and ostensibly 
seek to imprint the culture about which I am reflecting. “Autoethnography wants the 
reader to care, to feel, to empathize, and do something, to act” (Ellis & Bochner, 2006, p. 
433), navigating and negotiating our limits, be they physical or philosophical. In this 
way, I have come to see my writing as moving from personal to political, writing to right, 
with the aim to outline or describe the nebulous liminal spaces in which I operate when 
I’m at work (Jones, Adams, & Ellis, 2013).  
Victor Turner (1966) recognized the importance and significance of liminal 
spaces and felt it to be because the flux of a threshold-space prevented long-standing 
norms from becoming concrete. Originally explored by Van Gennep, liminal theory was 
further developed by Turner by extensively examining rituals within African 
communities in the 1960s. Filled with grainy black-and-white photographs and the 
minutiae of the rituals themselves, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-structure 
(1966) describes patterns of initiation, indoctrination, and the importance of those rites de 
passage in either reestablishing social order or shifting to alter the previous norms. The 
shared and negotiated norms may persist over a long period of time, but the in-between-
ness allows those norms to be malleable and more fluid in the liminal culture’s 
receptivity to newness. In this way, I am a recipient of the ICU culture in which I work, 
but also may influence how the culture is “done” yet remain “undone” or unfinished. An 
autoethnography, incidentally, is also, in many ways, reciprocal. As Ellis (1999) 
describes,  
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Memory doesn’t work in a linear way, nor does life either, for that matter. Instead, 
thoughts and feelings circle around us; flash back, then forward; the topical is 
interwoven with the chronological; thoughts and feelings merge, drop from our 
grasp, then reappear in another contrast. (p. 675)  
The autoethnography within a liminal space fits serendipitously well, “speaking from, 
for, and to the margins” (Boylorn & Orbe, 2016, p. 18), almost as liminal itself, in this 
case, as its topic.  
Liminality is a way of describing as-yet-unfinished processes that punctuate the 
end of one thing and the beginning of another. These processes are driven by social 
norms, and the rituals and borders are culturally shared. The rites de passage, as van 
Gennep coined (Turner, 1994), that become norms are forged by all stakeholders, 
including not only the participants but the witnesses. Marriage, graduation, death—all of 
these events are recognized as phases that are assumed to change the individual and her 
or his relationship with and within the culture, and those phases are punctuated by ritual 
to recognize the event as exceptional. However, although it could be argued that all 
people, in some way, have lives interrupted or punctuated by liminal phases, it does not 
necessarily translate to easy passage. While liminal events or spaces are highly ritualized 
(a bride wears something old, something new, something borrowed, something blue), 
there are few rules dictating what those rituals must include (a bride may wear white but 
may choose not to—it does not change that the ceremony is a wedding), or even how 
long they are to last (teenage years are technically from 13—19, but some youth launch 
into teen-like behavior earlier during their “tweens,” and similarly may carry on later 
while simultaneously taking up adult-like responsibilities within this space—current 
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popular internet memes have recently seen adults humourously noting the difficulties of 
“Adulting”). As Mahon-Daly and Andrews (2002) note, “people cannot always move 
smoothly between these states, but sometimes they are held in a state of liminality” (p. 
64). And then there are those who exist in a permanently liminal zone, suspended in a 
“betwixt and between” state (Navon & Morag, 2004, p. 2344). Turner labels such 
inhabitants, “liminal persona” (1994, p. 6).  Again, there is the notion that it is difficult to 
grapple with cultural constructions when we are unaware of their existence: Turner notes, 
“as members of society, most of us see only what we expect to see, and what we expect 
to see is what we are conditioned to see when we have learned the definitions and 
classifications of our culture” (p. 6). 
An autoethnography within a hospital is a move away from the predominantly 
positivistic model of the hospital and traditional Western medicine. Data, numbers, tests, 
measurements, and the cataloging of page after page of detailed vital signs are swept 
aside for a moment. The soft, warm, human in the bed defies measurement, and so does 
the emotional response we have to each other. How much? in a more quantitative piece 
may be transformed into, simply, how? in qualitative research, and then how do I? in an 
autoethnography. And then what am I? The subtle shifts allow the conversation to turn 
from blood pressure measurements and death tolls to experiences and life stories. While I 
understand the necessity for data, I need to exist within the life stories, to participate in 
research that “displays multiple layers of consciousness, connecting the personal to the 
cultural” (Ellis, Bochner, 2000, as cited in Ellis & Bochner, 2006, p. 733). Or, as Ellis 
and Bochner (2006) state,  
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Instead of being obsessively focused on questions of how we know, which 
inevitably leads to a preference for analysis and generalization, autoethnography 
centers attention on how we should live and brings us into lived experiences in a 
feeling and embodied way. This is the moral of autoethnographic stories—its 
ethical domain. (p. 11) 
To that end, my autoethnography must convey, with clear language and strength of 
conviction (Laurence, 2007), the emotional heart—more than just a green line displaying 
an electrical signature, just blips sliding across a monitor screen. I will explore the ICU 
experience as it seems to me, and do my best to round out my thoughts with personal 
anecdotes, conversations with my peers, as well as supporting my assertions with 
examples from the literature.  If “caring for those who are dying is like looking into a 
living mirror in which our emotional experiences of fear, anger, and attachment rise to 
the surface” (Bruce & Davies, 2005, p.1331), I believe I need fictional literature to 
describe what that is like—there seems no better way to explore both the human 
experience and paradox. Another autoethnographer, Wall (2006), also comes to mind 
with her thought that “I have lived long enough to have learned that when I am thinking 
something, I know someone else is, too” (p. 10).  
I will begin with discussing liminality in the medical literature, touching on the 
ways Turner’s theory has been interpreted by various authors in various fields, for there 
are many interpretations and applications. From there I will explore the ways in which I 
have interpreted the theory, exploring some spaces that are betwixt and between, neither 
here nor there, within the hospital, from broad to intimate, then very broad, and discuss 
limits surrounding these, including those physical and philosophical. These are the places 
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where we—both the nurses with the patients and their families—may lean on ritual, since 
there is often little assurance as to the outcome. These are procedures that are often seen 
as “just the way things are done” but reflect liminality symbolically. As to the order in 
which I have written about liminal realms, it has been first to establish context, second to 
give examples of how it looks in my experience in an ICU, then third how it fits in my 
experience of the bigger picture. Beyond this basic framework, there have been no 
specific reasons for the order in which I have written events or examples other than to 
satisfy my feeling that it fits a narrative arc. “There is no simple forward or backward: 
there is only a tangle of present and past, eruptions of memory and conjecture and 
wishing stitched into the fabric of the moment” (Saul, 2006, p. 111).  
Ethics of the autoethnography 
Within the context of writing about my work, inserting the I, I have also inserted 
others’ stories as well. I have written about my own experience, but my experience is 
within the context of a space that regularly deals with life-changing events for others, and 
those events require a strict adherence to confidentiality. Additionally, my coworkers, 
although not under patient confidentiality rules but still falling under ethics requirements 
for the purpose of this paper, have been cited generally but not explicitly. Peterson (2015) 
points out that using autoethnographies in nursing research pose unique challenges, such 
as an ambiguous or nebulous process for obtaining consent from others. It is therefore 
essential to note that all anecdotes and scenarios found in this paper are composites. Not 
only is this important for ethics purposes, but for the purpose of this paper and my intent 
being to convey the spirit of our interactions. In other words, no one scenario would be 
adequate to represent what it means to nurse in a liminal space. There are events that, 
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once repeated an uncountable number of times, can be (must be?) seen as ritual. These 
are the events that I will speak to and about. It is the repetitive nature of our experiences 
that has affected our collective psyche. These are conversations that occur over and over, 
reinforcing to me the existence of gaps between nurses, doctors, patients, and families. 
Shared with the reader, here is a conglomeration of things overheard or conversations in 
which I have joined which may be considered the zeitgeist of a typical ICU.   
To eliminate any risk of breeching confidentiality obligations to patients, I have 
modified the details of their condition, merging details of several patients in order to 
obscure their identity while retaining the salient elements that make my point. Again, the 
examples I use are representative of a broader picture, and while autobiographical, the 
experiences blur together with elements that are interchangeable, becoming something 
bigger and more broadly applicable and significant in the implications for care than the 
individuals they represent. In fact, with a few exceptions, this is how they inhabit my 
memory as well. 
Liminality in Medical Literature 
Liminality is not a new idea, generally, within medical literature. Illness and 
hospital anthropologic studies have been undertaken where the physical space—either the 
hospital or the body itself—is considered liminal. Bruce and Davies (2005) note that  
liminality points to an in-between space both beyond and within dualities, that is, 
a space in the hyphen within the living-dying or presence-absence. In this space, 
opposites meet in-between, where one is both living yet dying, or present yet 
absent. (p. 1336)  
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In-between spaces punctuate the passage from one thing to another, inhabiting the 
hyphen. Put another way, cited by Saul (2006) in her examination of the writing by poet 
Fred Wah, Wah is quoted as saying of the hyphen:  
Though it is in the middle, it is not in the centre. It is a property marker, a 
boundary post, a borderland, a bastard, a railroad, a last spike, a stain, a cypher, a 
rope, a know, a chain (link), a foreign word, a warning sign, a ‘head tax,’ a 
bridge, a noman’s land, a nomadic floating magic carpet, now you see it now you 
don’t. (Saul, 2006, p. 115)  
Wah struggled with the notion of mixed race and what it meant to him, and Saul notes 
that the hyphen “thus puts pressure on assumptions about identity” (p. 115) while it opens 
and links one idea to another. Similarly, the liminal in-between’s hyphen has an 
indeterminable space, and one that may shift and move. Wah’s hyphen seems to have as 
much to say as the spaces around it, according to Saul, who describes his hyphen as 
powerful, making its presence known by “rattling and clanging” (p. 127) within the text, 
slamming doors and punctuating the spaces he and his host of characters inhabit. In the 
same way, the hyphen in medical literature may be a function of the perception of the in-
between and therefore have a myriad of interpretations yet unexplored.  
 Additionally, sometimes rather than inhabiting a liminal space, ambiguity (or the 
hyphen) is embodied by people who represent the liminal space themselves, and there are 
again examples of this in multiple iterations and interpretations in the literature. For 
instance, someone having elevated cholesterol may be said to embody a liminal space 
because the condition has a label and real repercussions but few palpable effects (Hoel 
Felde, 2010). Another example is men living with advanced prostate cancer and the 
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effects of hormonal therapy, as the men living through this treatment feel they have 
changed and that they represent a between-space, as they are no longer themselves 
(Navon & Morag, 2004). Infertility has a liminal effect for some women in that they feel 
that they occupy a marginal space, isolated and away from fertile women (Allan, 2007). 
Conversely, physical boundaries mark liminal spaces for some, such as Mexican 
women who have traversed a perilous border to the United States where they remain 
undocumented and unrecognized (McGuire & Georges, 2003). Likewise, a condition 
state such as cystic fibrosis that, in itself, may not change, sees the individual aging, and 
as such that individual is required to seek new spaces for treatment, transitioning from a 
children’s space or pediatric hospital to an institution built for adults (Tierney et al., 
2013). There has been research focused on multiple elements of illness and wellness 
connected to the idea of liminality ostensibly because the ideas resonated with the authors 
when they looked at the feelings of those they were studying and their common refrain of 
feeling betwixt and between—a phrase that can be found in many articles dealing with 
liminality. 
Physical spaces researched include liminality of various domains in the hospital 
such as the ones authors Long, Hunter, and van der Geest (2008) explore. They assert that 
hospital ethnography was not recognized as a site of research until “post-colonialism 
moved the anthropological focus from the exotic of the Other to shine a light on the 
exotic of the Self” (p. 71). The trend to recognize the hospital or illness as a unique 
backdrop for shared experiences continues to be explored, with “hospital-as-island and 
hospital-as-culturally-embedded” (p. 71) being a reimagining of this space with 
anthropologic beginnings. Further recognized and explored has been the idea of 
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liminality and risk within a context of mental health (Warner & Gabe, 2004), where 
people with mental health challenges find themselves “caught in the middle” (p. 388) and 
existing “in between” (p. 388) because “they neither fit fully into society, nor are they 
fully excluded as in the asylum system” (p. 388). Warner and Gabe (2004) note that 
liminality and liminal people are “associated with threat or unease” (p. 388), but there is 
some uncertainty as to which informs which: the boundary-pushing state of an individual 
making them inhabit liminality or the poorly understood individual forced to inhabit a 
margin.  It would seem that this very ambiguity sums up the nebulous nature of a liminal 
state. Further literature has investigated liminality and the body (Johnston, 2011; Mahon-
Daly & Andrews, 2002), insofar as it explores “spatial divides such as public/private, and 
work/home” (Mahon-Daly & Andrews, 2002, p. 63), providing, they say, an arguably 
more modern approach to the study of breastfeeding by exploring the participants’ 
experiences rather than “purely adding to the existing empirical knowledge base.” 
Mahon-Daly and Andrews (2002) call these researchers “medical geographers” (p. 64), 
recognizing both the anthropologic and physical body-related nature of their study.   
On liminality in the literature with regards to technology, Lapum, et al (2012) 
explore how the humanness of caregivers can be regained in an environment where 
technology threatens to create a dualism, with person-centered practice on one end of a 
spectrum always seemingly opposite the machine. They discuss traversing the liminal 
space that divides technology and person-centered practice. They suggest that by 
recognizing this liminal space, we can maintain our humanity as we care for patients.  
Liminality and the mind is discussed in Kelly’s (2008) paper, in which she 
proposes that while the stages of liminality are well explored and understood, the social 
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and emotional face of liminality are less so. She explores the notion of living-in-loss 
rather than living-with-loss, as with patients who are experiencing AIDS dementia.  
There is literature on the nature of humour between nurses and their patients as 
well as nurse staff (Astedt-Kurki & Isola, 2001) that suggests that humour is a form of 
communication that enables therapeutic exchanges among those who share a laugh. It is 
important to note that in this case, I am making the link between humour and the liminal 
because here the humour exists for only a select few: in this case, between the nurse and 
patient and between the nurse and other caregivers, and the humour is likely 
nontransferrable. That is, the humour is possible because the participants share the 
space—it is very context driven. In the case of humour in an ICU, the humour is liminal 
because the primary participants (the health care workers) are operating at the margins, 
unable to transfer their humourous experiences anywhere else—they remain unsharable. 
As the authors state, “Humour is often context-bound, too. The close integration of 
humour and the situation contributes to some nurses having difficulty in describing that 
humour afterwards” (p. 453). I would argue that it is not only because the humour is tied 
to the context or situation, but also because the humour would be considered 
inappropriate or would simply not be understood by anyone else but a nurse (or 
sometimes a health care worker). I will speak more on humour and its liminal nature 
later. 
Liminality has been discussed in many realms in the literature, with frequent 
explorations of the concept within medical and hospital contexts. However, despite this 
relative abundance, there has been little research done with the idea of liminality in the 
hospital with a focus on an ICU nurse’s experience, and none that could currently be 
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found with an autoethnographic approach. I will begin by looking at what liminality 
means within a hospital and ICU context. 
Exploring Liminality and situating it within a hospital and its Intensive Care Unit  
Nurses—and for the purpose of this paper ICU nurses—inhabit a region in which 
they experience flux-in-action. They—we—are the liminal persona. In caring for patients 
who have had unexpected physical trauma through major surgery, a drug overdose, or 
cancer, the nurse resides at the shore of a patient’s and his or her family’s attempt to 
cope. The nurse permanently inhabits a zone that is uncharted and perpetually 
unresolved. As Turner (1994) would put it, we are liminal in that we are “at once no 
longer classified and not yet classified” (p. 6). Resolution and transition, however, is not 
only probably impossible but unnecessary. Nurses learn how to operate in this cleft, and 
from my own experience, it fosters an existential feel—one which nurse theorists 
Paterson & Zderad (1976/1988) (gendered language notwithstanding) write, “calls for a 
recognition of each man as existing singularly in-his-situation and struggling and striving 
with his fellows for survival and becoming, for confirmation of his existence and 
understanding its meaning” (p. 4). By discussing this particular liminal space, the one 
inhabited by the nurse in an ICU, the unspeakable becomes spoken, the concealed 
becomes revealed. The rites de passage that describe the thresholds through which 
participants must pass are (not surprisingly) quite different phases for the patient and her 
or his family than for the nurse who accompanies them in their journey. For the patient, 
their Intensive Care Unit experience is marked by numerous liminal rites de passage— 
beginning with their initial introduction to the hospital to the daily routines foisted upon 
them irrespective of their feelings about them. For the nurse, the pathway through 
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liminality is much longer—seemingly unending, even, in that it may last one’s entire 
career. Early in his or her career, the nurse experiences the paradoxes of the environment, 
having to reconcile his or her knowing with the not-knowing of others.   
Liminality in the Hospital 
There are so many liminal spaces in a hospital that there are hardly spaces which 
could be seen as not in-between, but although initially overwhelmed by the thought that 
there are a multitude of liminal spaces, wondering where I should begin, I began to view 
the spaces as connected. Michel Cartry (1992), quotes Wittgenstein on the topic of rituals 
within a culture: “What one would like to do is trace the lines linking common 
components” (p. 26). I, too, would like to trace the lines connecting some common 
components. Once I began to look at the zones of a hospital that are in-between and 
liminal, I noticed that there are many, and sought to find meaning. As Cartry asks himself 
and the reader, “How is one to reconstruct from these features a composition that takes 
multiple linkages into account?” (p. 26).  Most broadly, they (liminal spaces and the 
rituals that accompany them) are connected by place: the hospital. They are also 
connected in that the hospital is a space that causes upheaval in the patients’ lives. They 
must endure a passage from one place to another, having no (or very few) bearings, no 
calibrating signposts to tell them what time of day it is, where they are, or what is 
expected of them. For nurses, they face daily uncertainty about who they are to care for, 
how sick or unstable their patients will be, or how a stable patient will suddenly “turn 
sour” or “go south” (unexpectedly do poorly). In the ICU, the stakes become higher; the 
rituals may not even be noticed by the patient as they may have a profoundly decreased 
awareness of their surroundings due to illness and sedation provided to ease their 
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experience. However, for the families, they have been plunged into uncertainty with the 
added task of being vigilant for their loved one, the patient, who is possibly unable to 
speak for her/himself. Even the entrance to the ICU fits Turner’s notion of a threshold 
that must be transitioned across, as the ICU has locked doors that will be opened from 
inside the unit only after the family member has called in for permission to enter on a 
dedicated phone located outside those doors.  
Let us begin with one liminal event that we have all experienced to some degree: 
sickness. Health is punctuated with various bouts of sickness that take us out of our usual 
routines in varying degrees. When you are feeling unwell, but are still able to participate 
in your normal activities, the feeling of being a little disconnected from your usual 
routine may be all you experience. The sicker you are, the more disconnected you may 
become since you cannot participate in work, play, or anything constructive or normal 
according to your usual life. Increasingly sequestered by illness, those around you 
generally understand you’re currently not part of the usual circles you’re committed to—
you’re relieved from work or household duties and are often explicitly told to stay in bed. 
There are family rituals to sickness—my family has a rain poncho and a dedicated puke-
bucket to go over it if one of the kids is sick with a stomach flu, for example. Certainly 
every family has rote responses to mild sickness in the home, especially for children—
clothing one wears, blankets one prefers, or medicine routinely offered. 
 If you’re sick enough, you must get to (or be brought to) a hospital where you’ll 
have professionals attend to your health. This is where sickness, for most, takes an 
unfamiliar turn. Long et al. (2008) quote Rose Laub Coser’s Life in the Ward (1962) in 
their paper about hospital ethnography:  
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While the patient lies in his bed in the ward, the outside world recedes from view. 
Through the windows, if any appear within his range of vision, he can only see 
the roofs of surrounding buildings, all part of the same hospital … Even his 
relatives drifting in at 1 p.m., may come to seem “strangers,” divorced from the 
main problem that faces him now: the problem of cure. Family and friends belong 
to past or future; and wear an air of unreality. (p. 72) 
Illness takes you out of your spheres of relationships and commitments, and you 
become part of the running of a building dedicated to illness. However, the institution 
relies on a set of rules with which you are unfamiliar—like visiting a different country 
where you can experience jet lag, new norms, and social rituals—without the time change 
or stamp in your passport. There are indoctrination procedures, according to Turner 
(1969), and these would be the rituals that punctuate the entrance into the liminal space. 
The hospital is like the vehicle to health … or sometimes the vessel one remains 
harboured within until death. You arrive in your own clothing, but quickly must swap 
your outer identity for a hospital gown. You lose your usual hair style—it’s in ruins 
because you’re unable or unwilling to keep your usual routine of showers or styling. If 
you’re unwell enough (and wear them), your dentures will be removed and probably 
generally forgotten or ignored by caregivers—you’ve got bigger fish to fry now, and your 
collapsed face bears little resemblance to your out-of-hospital self. Your mouth will be 
cleaned, but more likely by a foam swab attached to suction than a tooth brush and tooth 
paste.   
Perhaps you’re too weak to eat or have been deemed unable to safely swallow (an 
inside joke in the hospital is that most staff would be deemed unsafe to swallow, so strict 
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are the assessments by the speech language pathologists), so you will be fed thickened 
fluids and soft foods easier to manage with weakened swallowing. If you are unable to 
swallow—either due to weakness or because you’ve got an endotracheal breathing 
tube—you may get a feeding tube, uncomfortably threading through your face (your nose 
or your mouth) into your stomach, trickling a flavoured (but not for you) liquid to satisfy 
your hunger. But not your need to taste. If you’ve been unable to eat for a long enough 
period of time and are not expected to improve soon (if at all), you will get a tube 
punched directly through your abdomen into your stomach. These acts further 
indoctrinate you into the hospital—reestablishing and negotiating margins. What was 
unconsidered initially by you or your family—various ever more invasive treatments and 
invasive procedures—will be presented, one by one, as the illness trajectory denies you 
immediate recovery. The proof of this existential journey through sickness may be visible 
only via the literal scars you’ve accumulated, although you have endured much more than 
what is visible. What you have endured are the symbolic acts that demonstrate to all that 
you’re not just a citizen but a patient—a citizen of the hospital. You will be washed, often 
at times that may not suit you (although day from night may be difficult to distinguish 
anyway), but when it suits the nursing staff. Additionally, you may be unaware of your 
need to be washed at all—having a feeding tube trickle high-nutritive food day and night 
will certainly upset the routine bowel patterns you had when you were well, and you may 
have a bowel movement when you least expect it. Aware patients who experience fecal 
incontinence are generally mortified, but nurses expect nothing less than bowels that 
move to their own clock. These are the rituals of illness the patient must endure. The 
washing itself is sometimes less for the patient and more for the staff---the unwell 
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human’s presence of bodily odour is expected to be removed according to hospital ritual. 
This, too, is in line with Turner’s description of liminality, where the procedures of 
entering into this new (liminal) space are expected, shared, and reestablished by those 
who are part of that culture—in this case, the nurses.  
To illustrate this, I share this anecdote: Early in my career, I had a patient on a 
medical ward who was sent for a test (she was stable enough to be taken by a porter 
unmonitored by me). When she was returned, I received a call from the area in which she 
had her test done, with the tech wanting to tell me that the patient needed her teeth 
brushed. This was a patient who was unwell but fairly independent! As a new nurse at the 
time, I was thoroughly shamed and mortified, as I was clearly not living up to the 
expectations of others—not behaving like a good nurse. My point here is not whether I 
should have insisted an independent patient perform her own daily hygiene routines 
(perhaps she neglected this aspect of her life at home) or offered to assist her (awkward 
for me at the time—I did not yet know how to navigate these conversations), but more to 
suggest that there are expectations of the nurses, and not just by other nursing staff—
there are understood cultural norms and rituals within the hospital that are explicit and 
repeatedly reaffirmed.  The nurse who has left her patient unkempt will be judged as 
somewhat neglectful, forgiven only if the shift has been exceptionally busy. And then, the 
nurse usually provides some explanation of her inability to get to washing the patient 
when giving report to the next nurse.  ICU nurses in my unit have, over the years, taken 
to bringing their own arsenal of scented products, possibly in response to the 
disappearance of hospital-supplied scented cleaning solutions and salves, no doubt due to 
budget constraints. While to speak of cleaning products brought by nurses may be a 
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digression in the discussion on liminality, the ritual of the bath, too, is an important 
indoctrination into patientness and cannot be overlooked. Patients who have, for their 
entire lives, had a beard, may have their beards shaved in the ICU so that an appliance for 
holding an endotracheal tube may be fastened to their cheeks. Conversely, patients who 
are very ill and may have hygiene routines that they have practiced their whole lives—for 
example, men who do shave their face—may have these particular aspects ignored either 
from the nurse’s discomfort with the procedure or simply because it is an acceptable 
lapse in a nurse’s “upkeep,” as he or she has to prioritize the patient’s care. In the ICU, 
the lack of a bed bath will generally do no harm, while allowing an important drug 
infusion to run dry may. Patients are often rendered nearly unrecognizable by their 
families, either by their illness or the tubes and wires that run into and on them. It is not 
uncommon for a family member, disoriented to our unit, to wander into another patient’s 
room and not realize for a moment that they are not in their own relative’s company (and 
one family member went so far as to embrace his “mother,” who, it turns out, was not his 
mother at all!).  
 To further emphasize the indoctrination into the hospital and establish the 
person’s position as patient, there is a strict identification system in place, where identity 
must be provided upon arrival and subsequently worn on the wrist or sometimes ankle, 
available for any “official” to see before blood can be drawn, medication given, or a test 
carried out. Verbal exchanges are, for most patients, in their native English. However, 
even when the language of the patient and the provider are the same, there is a different 
set of vocabulary patients must sort through, with references to new metrics and numbers 
they must interpret. There is unpredictability, framed within the hospital routine. But the 
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routine, while composed of rituals (lab work, vital signs, turning and repositioning, 
suctioning, tests, ICU rounds, visiting hours, visiting hour denial, and on and on) adds 
little to provide context for time-of-day for the new health-forced émigré. Day and night 
look similar, seasons are irrelevant since the windows are often mostly occluded or 
without a view from their bed and do not open to provide warm or cool air or birdsong to 
orient a person. Patients wearing oxygen very commonly ask me if it is raining, because 
of the sound cue they are receiving as a quiet hiss they interpret as outside weather.  
Generally, festivities are for permanent inhabitants (the staff) alone: the birthday 
celebration where a hospital stretcher is covered with a hospital sheet and laid out with 
food or a few decorations at the nurses’ station at Christmas. However, while not 
intentionally hidden, most patients would be completely unaware of the small nods to 
broader cultural practices. The patient him or herself is stripped down, looking like all the 
other patients, confined to a bed made with starched white sheets and unadorned, 
unbleached cotton blankets.  
The hospital is a place where questions about meaning present themselves with 
more urgency than in the routine of everyday life. It could be said that hospital life 
represents a condensation and intensification of life in general because it reflects the 
values and beliefs of the larger society, bringing our culture into focus and, with it, the 
things we collectively find important (Long et al., 2008). Where some rites of passage are 
the domain of religious leaders such as the wedding or funeral, illness within a hospital is 
a liminal zone that is devoted to transformations separate from decreed pathways. There 
are printed plans of care that, say, the surgical nurse is supposed to look to in order to 
proceed with the patient, through a preset number of preprinted steps that guide care and 
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help the patient understand what to expect before, during, and after a planned surgery, for 
example. However, care plans are beneficial only for those who choose to have an 
elective surgery—those who venture into the hospital willingly. Unfortunately, most ICU 
patients have not chosen to participate but are thrust into this beeping, whooshing, 
brightly-lit zone of the hospital, often intubated, sedated, unaware, and stuck in a state of 
sick.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LIMINAL SPACES FOR HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS 
Not only does the separation from the family and patient’s perspective push the 
nurse into a liminal space, but there is also a separation between the nurse and her fellow 
health care providers. Dr. Brian Goldman, notable for his CBC show White Coat, Black 
Art (Goldman, 2007) , suggests in his book The Secret Language of Doctors (2014) that 
nurses are unconcerned if care is futile: “After all, futility doesn’t come out of their 
pocketbooks. Publicly funded health care, private, or a mixture of the two—it doesn’t 
matter. Futile or not, we get paid to care” (p. 105). I wonder how he could suggest this in 
the face of an arsenal of literature to the contrary (McCarthy & Gastmans, 2015). As a 
respected representative of his profession, as demonstrated by his tenure on CBC, Dr. 
Goldman has a fairly far-reaching voice. As an esteemed representative of the medical 
profession, his opinion becomes representative of a larger problem of recognizing the 
gulf of nonunderstanding. As a medical doctor, he has close knowledge of how his fellow 
healthcare providers work within the hospital, yet there is such acute disagreement on the 
response to the idea of futile care. How can there be this gulf between what the nurse is 
experiencing (and whose Moral Distress experience is documented and well established 
in the literature) and his off-handed remark that it is a nonissue? If he were to care for 
patient after patient with irreversible debilitating conditions, rotting bodies, left to 
languish for months, becoming less and less themselves, perhaps he would understand 
exactly why we do care, and deeply, about futile care. With an objective to help, the 
nurse is prohibited from providing solace from suffering—the very drugs that are 
available to help the patient cope are the ones that may lower a blood pressure or, through 
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the principle of duel effect, hasten death even as they comfort the patient. The research 
on Moral Distress in the literature supports the presence of nurses’ attempt to come to 
terms with the ethical grappling with ‘what is right for the patient.’  
Nonetheless, I am not surprised that Dr. Goldman does not “get it.” This is a 
pattern experienced frequently in the ICU. Goldman, and many other physicians, get to 
remain, largely, on the “clean side” of the curtain, while nurses go forth armed with an 
arsenal of products from home-supplied premium bath soaps and oils to industrial-
strength absorbent dressings and diapers in an attempt to combat physical disintegration 
and all of the visual, aural, and olfactory stimulus that that provides. When simply 
turning patients causes pain because they are inadequately anaesthetized, there are only 
so many times one can say, “I’m sorry” before it feels insincere and inhumane. It is 
unlikely that Goldman has been exposed to this other side of futile care.  
I have added a scenario here which reflects a typical experience with a new 
coworker—a reminder for me that our actions have palpable effects. When I work with 
new nurses, I have the benefit of seeing our ICU through their eyes, helping me gain a 
fresh view. We often care for elderly patients whose delirium becomes compounded by 
or compounds their preexisting baseline dementia. Frequently brought to the hospital 
with pneumonia, many clearly struggle with chronic conditions that left them physically 
very weak and cachexic. Too weak to even swallow, the only choice to provide nutrition 
is often a feeding tube, in the hope that increasing reserve would see them recover and 
return to the nursing home. My younger colleagues, although new, see this as a potential 
problem for the patient: Even the patients who are oriented and cooperative struggle with 
the presence of a tube that runs from the nostril to the stomach—it is, in my experience, 
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the first tube to be pulled out by patients themselves simply because it is so annoying 
even once it is in. Even endotracheal tubes that are used to help patients breathe are often 
tolerated better than a nasogastric tube—both because we can provide sedation for a tube 
that has ventilator on the other end (to pick up the respiratory rate if it drops because of 
medication), but also because nasogastric tubes are just that uncomfortable. Even worse 
is the insertion of the tube—imagine someone inserting a cold (covered with lubricant), 
firm tube into the nose and pushing it down the throat, always triggering gagging and 
many times threaded into the larynx (because the two pathways diverge at the back of the 
throat and the inserter has no way to know immediately which one she is choosing), 
causing the patient fits of coughing and an intense feeling of breathlessness. We can 
attempt to explain this to next-of-kin, partners or children of the patient, who usually 
insist that a tube be inserted in spite of the risks and discomfort, which is 
understandable—they see the tube as a means to an end. However, the actual insertion 
inevitably becomes a wrestling match between the nurse and the patient, with the patient 
often restrained or held down by a second nurse. Even severely demented patients have 
yelled hoarsely, “No! I don’t want that! Stay away from me!” all the while gagging, 
coughing, struggling to breathe, while we wrestle the tube down. These actions have had 
a profound effect on my young coworkers, who have repeatedly told me, in various ways, 
that they are becoming used to inflicting horrible actions on patients. Upset and feeling 
complicit in an abusive situation, my new coworkers—and indeed all nurses—are forced 
to inflict profound physical and psychological discomfort on the orders of the patient’s 
family and the patient’s doctor, and I am reminded by their discomfort what it means to 
feel humane and sorry for the work I do. My years of experience have inured me to some 
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degree to my own psychological discomfort—I, too, see these actions as ridiculous in 
their banal cruelty, but accept that the nurse is corralled into performing them. My 
reaction with having to perform them has transformed from sadness or regret to anger 
and, often, resentment. There is little I can tell new staff that is reassuring, other than to 
be optimistic that one day conversations about care and the kindness that may be found 
within it may be different, and that their reactions of horror are ethical, sound, and 
humane.    
I recall a passage in Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963/2006), where 
she reflects on the tragedy of the “duties of a law-abiding citizen” (p. 135). She says, of 
the war criminal,  
So Eichmann’s opportunities for feeling like Pontius Pilate were many, and as the 
months and the years went by, he lost the need to feel anything at all. This was the 
way things were, this was the new law of the land, based on the Fuhrer’s order; 
whatever he did he did, as far as he could see, as a law-abiding citizen. He did his 
duty, as he told the police and the court over and over again; he not only obeyed 
orders, he also obeyed the law. (p. 135) 
 Likewise, I feel that nurses are sometimes simply the “law-abiding citizens” who 
are eventually able to enact questionable procedures without the attention of the families 
or physicians in order to halt those procedures. Neither are we currently able to have 
conversations that will articulate exactly why those actions and procedures are difficult. 
Nursing school equips the student with the how-to knowledge, but less often supports 
conversations about why, much less how to engage in meaningful discussions with the 
stakeholders. In one paper examining the nurses’ experience with care for the dying, a 
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nurse is quoted as questioning how she had changed: “I wonder what kind of person I am 
sometimes” (Kirchhoff et al., 2000, p. 40). We sometimes discuss this at work, and a 
coworker has named this condition—this process: an empathectomy. It is a clever, if not 
somewhat bitter portmanteau to reflect the removal of empathy. It is an ironic erosion of 
caring by degrees through caring in terrible ways.  
Liminality in Nurse Knowing 
Nurses Know. Most broadly, nurses know things medically that patients and 
families generally do not know. Even if the patient is familiar with some aspects of the 
body, there are rituals and schedules and norms of which the nurse has knowledge. How 
the equipment for treatment works—the ventilator with the lungs, the purpose of 
intravenous fluid, the intravenous catheter and the body’s vessels, the electrocardiogram 
monitoring and the heart, and so on. There are schedules of medications, feeding via a 
tube, turning, mouth care, and countless other nurse-related duties. Part of becoming a 
patient, arguably, begins with learning (or at least, being exposed to) these norms and 
rituals.  
Nurses often know your diagnosis before you do. If you’re a patient in the ICU, 
the nurse would accompany you to any test you would have out of the unit. Although the 
information the nurse would get would be “unofficial” (say, a CAT scan or an ultrasound 
done by technicians would have to be reviewed by a doctor specialist), but the techs 
certainly know what they’re looking at, and the nurse is included in these conversations. 
The nurse sees your blood work first and often knows you have a tumour or the results of 
that biopsy in advance of your receiving that information from a doctor. Nurses do not 
wish to hide their knowledge of your body but must continue to work with you as though 
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they don’t know. There is a liminal quality to this because it is a knowledge that remains 
unsharable—the nurse is in-between, gathering information, whether he or she wants to 
or not, unable to reveal that information to the patient or family. 
 The nurse knows, but unlike health teaching or explanations of what she is about 
to do (“I’m going to turn you on your side now,” “I’m going to suction your lungs now,” 
“these pills are for your blood pressure”), the nurse is unable to share some kinds of 
information because she or he is without the ability to diagnose, prognose, and build a 
plan for treatment independent from the physician. Additionally, the nurse cannot, 
according to the College of Nurses, report on diagnostic findings prior to a physician 
having a conversation with the patient and family. So although nurses have been found to 
have the most accurate predictions when it comes to prognosis of a patient (Frick, 
Uehlinger & Zuercher Zenklusen, 2003), we are bound to withhold any suggestion of 
such (the same study revealed that, interestingly, nurses are also most pessimistic in their 
judgement, perhaps reflecting, in my personal experience, the dark bent nurses seem to 
take the longer they reside in their profession). This liminal space of knowing—in the 
context of patient wondering—emphasizes again the murky margin in which the nurse 
operates.  
 The nurse is also bound to a confidentiality agreement. According to the 
Confidentiality and Privacy Practice Standards of the College of Nurses of Ontario 
(2009), nurses are expected to follow a strict code of conduct for the protection of the 
patient’s personal information. The expectation is that nurses will not share information 
with anyone who is outside the immediate “circle of care” unless it falls within the 
college’s definition of consent (which can be implied or explicit). This means that I can 
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call report to a nurse at a receiving facility that my patient is being brought to for a test, 
but I cannot provide information about my patient to someone on the phone who is 
claiming to be his wife (if I have had no way to establish that is who she is). Additionally, 
I am unable to talk about my patient with anyone else who is not involved with care, nor 
can I discuss care with a colleague while we are having lunch in the cafeteria. Staff 
cannot speak about patients while, say, in the elevator, or even with other staff who have 
previously cared for that patient in another area of the hospital if they are no longer 
within the circle of care. It also means that I cannot discuss a patient in a way that makes 
the patient identifiable, such as providing a name, or even a detailed description of their 
condition, if that could lead someone to identify the patient. If someone could identify a 
patient by the details I provide, I have breached my obligation of confidentiality and can 
potentially lose my license to practice. While it is paramount that patients have a safe and 
confidential space in which to choose what they share about their health and with whom, 
these necessary limitations have the potential to be a liminal space for the nurse who 
cannot speak about what she has experienced. The only people she or he can share or 
debrief the experience with are others who are within that information-sharing circle.  
I bring up confidentiality because nurses must be guarded in their knowledge, and 
it is often very difficult knowledge to share, even when it is “okay” to do so, because the 
knowledge is of things that are complicated and awkward to share, especially when 
nursing was not even what the nurse her/himself thought it would be. In the same way 
that members of the general public often believe they understand what happens in 
classrooms, people often think they understand what nursing looks like, because it seems 
like a profession that is easily relatable. One study examining the public’s perception of 
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nurses found that “the actual public image of nursing is diverse and incongruous. This 
image is partly self-created by nurses due to their invisibility and their lack of public 
discourse” (Hoeve, Jansen, & Roodbol, 2013, p. 295). I would suggest that the nurse is 
not understood ostensibly because of his or her inability to share knowledge that is 
confidential, and that is compacted by a lack of public discourse because what nurses do 
know is not easily explained. Nurses are caught in this way in an ironic position of 
knowing too much in a club too exclusive. We cannot share because we are, in many 
cases, not allowed, and we remain invisible because we cannot easily share.  
Marginalized, liminal situations are made worse when, say, the nurse has a 
difficult shift—one in which a patient unexpectedly dies, or dies in a particularly 
disturbing manner, or the nurse has an altercation with a patient or her or his family. The 
nurse is limited in those whom she can talk with about a patient or their situation by these 
confidentiality constraints. This is in no way a suggestion that there be changes to 
confidentiality agreements—rather, I would like to highlight how a nurse must guard her 
knowledge. If the situation is discussed with anyone who is not within the circle of care, 
there may be both confidentiality breeches and awkward conversations with people who 
do not understand. I sometimes joke (but secretly worry) that I am unfit for general 
society because I am occasionally oblivious to what is considered “appropriate” 
conversation. Once, as a guest at a wedding, a fellow guest asked me where I worked. At 
first I simply told her I was a nurse, avoiding drawing attention to the area in which I 
work. I have found that telling people I work in an ICU evokes a certain reaction that is 
clearly misguided, however well intentioned it may be. She asked where and in which 
department I worked, and when I told her, her eyebrows furrowed and her hand went to 
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her chest in a gesture of concern and sympathy. “Awwww, that must be very difficult,” 
she said, with her bottom lip pushed out to emphasize the effect, which made me bristle. I 
answered unkindly (although not dishonestly), “It’s okay, you get used to looking after 
people in an ICU. In fact, if you ask any ICU nurse, she’ll tell you our favourite type of 
patients are vented and sedated.” At the time, I thought I was (albeit lamely) being 
amusing, but I acknowledge now it was actually an inconsiderate and rude answer which 
was meant to shut down further conversation about my work. Her sympathy made me 
angry. She was transparent about her assumptions about my job and the people I look 
after, and my kneejerk was to shut down any further conversation. My knowledge and 
experience most comfortably reside at the periphery and do not easily traverse that 
threshold in a conversation where I can share what I really do. There is just too large a 
gulf between the nurse and the layman, who could not possibly be expected to 
understand, and I admit I struggle with this. One paper in which the researchers explore 
the experience of nurses with end-of-life care quotes a nurse as saying, “You go home 
and everybody is just doing their regular thing … , and it is like, you know, yeah, I had 
somebody die today, and people who don’t do this, don’t get it. They just don’t get it” 
(Kirchhoff et al., 2000, p. 41). I imagine it is no coincidence that there are nights at bars 
and clubs that are dedicated to health care workers such as nurses, paramedics, and 
firefighters at the same time—surely they face a similar gulf in understanding.  
The flip side of this is that nurses recognize each other in an uncannily short 
amount of time of being around each other. I have found I can identify a family member 
as a nurse when they come to visit—it’s often only a word or two that cue me to their 
profession, or the way they interact with the patient. It is difficult to describe, but I will 
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provide a personal example. My father had to have open heart surgery not long ago, and 
when I went to visit him the first time, he was still sedated and intubated, so I stayed for 
only a few moments. It was simply nice to see him finished with his surgery. I returned 
the following day, and although he was pale and puffy, he was awake and extubated and 
was able to talk with me for a bit. I told him, “I came to see you yesterday, but you were 
still gorked.” His nurse, who happened to be in the room at the time, immediately looked 
at me and said, “You’re a nurse, aren’t you?” I laughed, but was not surprised. We see 
each other. 
Nurses also know what death looks like, and it is a knowledge that no one wants. 
Never mind a gulf of poorly understood space between the nurse and other people 
because of our knowledge of the human condition—the nurse’s knowledge of death is an 
island no one wants to visit, let alone take up residence.  
When I started working as a nurse, it was in an oncology unit. I very quickly 
learned that everyone dies of cancer. At least, that was what I believed at the time. As a 
new nurse, I realized that I would need to reckon with my own mortality, seeing as I 
would surely die young, as most of my patients were, and I quickly grew to be convinced 
that most people did. I now recognize my skewed and inaccurate perspective, but that 
experience left a lasting impression on me: that there is little rhyme or reason, mostly, to 
many patients’ physical events that bring them to the hospital—they do nothing to cause 
it, deserve it. Even those who have addictions or habits which influenced their cancers or 
conditions could not be seen as deserving it, with the connections between addiction and 
illness remaining some of the most nebulous correlated-not-causal issues at large that 
cannot be explored here.  
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An ICU is also a place that sees death—the difference is that it can suddenly take 
much longer for the same, otherwise acute, physical process. We have life-supporting 
devices that are employed to sustain or suspend a human within that space between life 
and death. One American study found that “about one fifth of ICU patients die while 
hospitalized” (Beckstrand, & Kirchhoff, 2005, p. 395), and a nurse would likely make a 
good guess as to who that would be. However, my point is not that the nurse could 
predict who survives to leave the unit—my point is the feeling of taking care of a patient 
for whom life-extending care feels inappropriate. Philpin (2007), in her paper about 
ambiguity and danger in the ICU, speaks to the ICU patients’ liminality, because of their 
dependence on machines to survive. She says,  
In both conscious and unconscious technologically supported patients the 
ambiguity of their situation is intensified by their need for connection to a 
machine: from this perspective they could be described as ‘cyborgs’ […];  
the notion of a hybrid again suggests category confusion and being neither one 
thing nor another. (p. 53)  
Patients may languish for weeks sedated and ventilated, perhaps aware in a groggy, 
barely-conscious manner (because we keep it that way for their comfort, if possible), not 
allowed to die, yet not able to recover. There is liminality for the patient when he or she 
is suspended in this state of not-dead-not-alive, and the nurse shares the experience even 
though she or he is not living it. 
Nurses see the calamity dying brings, but also the stillness and quiet of death, the 
relief of it. The shift from one state to another is witnessed by the nurse, who is present 
for these events, even if the patient’s family members are not/cannot be. We have the last 
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look of the waxy face and mottled body as we close the zipper on a white vinyl bag. 
There are people, I have heard, who do not wish to live next to a cemetery because it 
would remind them daily of their own inevitable demise, but the nurse cannot deny and 
must confront, on a nearly daily basis, what awaits us all in time. Martin Frommer 
(2005), in his paper “Living in the Liminal Spaces of Mortality”, describes reviewing the 
obituaries in the morning and savouring not the death of those he knows, but the “psychic 
space where I become aware of myself as someone who also dies” (p. 481). Even the 
intensivist (ICU doctor specialist), who is intimately aware of the patient, is arguably not 
as acquainted with what Rabelais would describe as “the body grotesque” (Bakhtin, 1968, 
p. 19).  The doctor may be in close proximity but remains on the “clean” side of the room 
curtain. The nurse is thrust into the middle of any body fluid expulsions as they happen, 
as well as seeing the progression—the slow march—to death. In most cases, vital signs 
are recorded even when they are barely present until they simply no longer are, and the 
ECG (electrocardiogram) of the final heart beats are printed and added to the patient 
record. This arguably macabre practice of examining the tiny moments of the downward 
spiral, the minutiae of expiring, strikes me as absurdly unnecessary, yet I perpetuate it by 
also tallying the final breaths and the final electric signals of the agonal heartbeat, unsure 
of my role as an ICU nurse trained to detail the patient experience in chart form to 
transition to one who is merely a silent witness—I rely on my rituals, even after they are 
of no further use.   
 Nurse knowing is a liminal experience, and we are often alone in this realm. Even 
the doctors who are present for the patient’s needs sometimes find the nurses’ hesitation, 
reluctance, or bitterness about our “care” frustrating. I posit that doctors find it frustrating 
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because of the gap in our experiences: The doctor has a far more clear-cut plan for a 
patient’s care where once a day during rounds the patient is reviewed, the body systems 
itemized and dealt with, goals for treatment are announced, and the plan carried out. At 
least, this is their apparent perception. What the nurse sees is problem-solving that deals 
with trees without addressing the broader forest. Each part of the patient may be 
addressed but if the whole is a picture of slow decline, the nurse may wonder why there is 
guidance to provide care that is anything more than measures to comfort and alleviate 
anxiety and agony. The doctor seems to see it like this: The patient needs to be fed to get 
better, therefore the patient needs a feeding tube, so she or he orders a feeding tube. The 
nurse sees this: a frail and frightened patient who cannot understand what is happening, 
so the procedure to insert a feeding tube cannot be explained, and the patient is scared, 
angry, fighting the nurse as though the patient’s life depends on fending off his or her 
attackers. Once the nurse wrestles the tube in, the patient’s hands are restrained to prevent 
the patient from pulling the tube out again, which would start the process anew. The 
nurse carries out the doctor’s orders that seem benign and reasonable but are, in practice, 
terrible acts which lead to the nurse feeling conflicted, cruel or cynical.  
There are paradoxes here, within nurse knowing, which go beyond the liminal 
experience of death and dying. For example, nurses will not necessarily ask you about 
yourself. In fact, the nurse may not necessarily know anything personal about you except 
medical details. Very often the patient is unable to communicate other than to nod or 
shake his or her head yes or no, and sometimes not even that, yet the nurse can care for 
your life without actually knowing very much about it at all. Your medical background, 
which may include a remote tonsillectomy—although technically “medical history”—
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likely has little to do with your intestinal obstruction and is therefore left out of the 
conversation about you. However, that tonsillectomy may have been an important event 
in your life—the first time you were away from your home and family, the first time you 
had so much pain, the first time you knowingly embarked on the unknown, or the first 
removal of part of you from inside your body. However, it is as unexamined as much of 
your life by the medical staff. Patients’ family members often post pictures of their loved 
one when they were “well,” but the photos are too abstracted to change any of the 
treatment they are receiving from the nursing staff. The paradox can lie in the nurse’s 
knowledge of your body. She or he does not know (or particularly care, honestly) about 
what your favourite food is, but knows the texture (and smell) of your bowel movements. 
The nurse knows if you have blackheads on your back, a faded tattoo you may normally 
try to cover, toenails that look like cashews, and the state of your well- or under-
maintained teeth. The nurse is literally wiping, washing, brushing, or suctioning pretty 
much every part of your visible body while the inner workings are monitored via 
machines. And although things like a catheter for urine or rectal tube or intravenous 
catheters are ordered by the physician, it is still the nurse who inserts most of these 
plastic tubes into your body. We remain professional with the patient, but may recount 
exceptional experiences to each other, such as a particularly difficult catheter insertion or 
the way a toe came off in one’s hand during gentle cleaning, or a particularly difficult-to-
witness death. It is not to suggest we judge any of these—nurses quickly recognize that 
bodies are varied and exceptional in their own way, carrying any number of random 
outlying characteristics like unusual skin tags, fused toes, profoundly waxy ears, but I 
will acknowledge that there is a certain delight in noting the strange details of the human 
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body: oh, that’s the highest blood sugar I have ever seen! Or I have never seen maggots 
come out of a wound like that! At times, it seems as though the more challenging it is to 
care for a particular kind of body, the more we may privately cherish the memory of 
those peculiarities.  
We are attendants to literally anybody. While we may not exactly be reverent, 
there is an equalizing power to knowing that we are all vulnerable, we are all dependent 
on our physical selves, and that bodies are all recognizable as being largely the same. 
There is “an almost universal sameness in body imagery, for all must play on the same 
basic body and its same functions, and this sameness may be seen as a universal topos” 
(Koepping, 1985, p. 200). But the body, as well as being a wonder, is ridiculous. And to 
be alive is to share in that ridiculousness, since to be alive (as far as we know) is to have 
one. The body, as described by Francois Rabelais and examined by Mikhail Bakhtin, is 
the reflection of the life cycle, and can be considered “as something universal, 
representing all the people” (Bakhtin, 1968, p. 19). Bakhtin goes on to describe the 
Hieronymus Bosch-like interpretation of Rabelais and the exaggerated body: “The 
leading themes of these images of bodily life are fertility, growth, and a brimming-over 
abundance. … The material bodily principle is a triumphant, festive principle, it is a 
‘banquet for all the world’” (p. 19). Like a painting of spoiled fruit by Michelangelo 
Caravaggio, the body is a banquet that also fails, soils, and falls apart and must therefore 
be tended to, sometimes swiftly, with interventions that mean nothing to the physical 
body, only serving, perhaps, to placate the psyche of a few.  
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Nursing Death, or the Liminality of the Code Blue 
The most acutely liminal space in an ICU is the Code Blue. Generally referred to 
as, simply, a code (there are many types, but by calling it a code, the ICU staff are 
revealing that it is the only one we think is important) is a highly ritualized set of 
protocols where the code runners are trained to respond in a systematic fashion to the 
dying (or dead, technically) patient. There are clear steps: recognition, cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation (CPR) initiation, the call overhead, the arrival of the code team, and 
algorhythms to respond to the nature of the arrest. What makes it a liminal event is that 
the patient is neither here nor there during a code. While the patient is dead, the literal 
hands-on interventions are being carried out to prevent them from staying dead. On their 
own, left to the natural progression of their arrest, they will remain deceased. The 
interventions are the tubes, drugs, and sometimes electricity inserted into them that jolt 
their systems into operation again. Their waking is the definitive point at which the 
interventions (mostly) cease. More often, their heart regains its march, but the patient still 
never wakes. If the code team does not “get them back,” the code runs as long as those 
who are participating see appropriate, making it a very existential undertaking. There is 
only the now; plans for dinner are delayed. However, another anecdote fits here: Once 
during a code, the physician who was leading it heard a text on his phone which he 
looked at. He said, with incongruent excitement (certainly quite aware of the effect), “Oh 
hey! Someone wants to know my plans for this Easter weekend!”  There were no groans 
such as one would hear if the audience found a joke inappropriate. Rather, we laughed … 
no guffaws, mind you, but there was the implicit understanding by those participating 
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that the code blue was grim compared with the oblivious cheeriness of the outside world, 
making for an unexpectedly amusing juxtaposition.  
However, as a rule, the code runners are present in the moment, tallying and 
recording, problem-solving, and planning the next step, but only by a few minutes. Any 
intervention that would require more time to diagnose is moot unless the treatment can be 
provided immediately, since CPR is a very temporary fix. I have, however, participated 
in codes that lasted hours. Even though that is a very long time to run a code blue, 
compared to the patient’s lifetime, those last few hours are insignificant. It is the 
electricity zap of static at the tip of one’s finger when you touch someone on a dry winter 
day: blip. And yet, those hours contain such exhaustive scrutiny as to expand the time 
passing to its minutes, noting and denoting the punctuating drugs given: epinephrine, 
sodium bicarbonate, the tallying of micrograms of levophed, dopamine, more epi, more 
bicarb, ‘pressin, blood products, CPR, CPR, and more CPR, and always the recording of 
the patient’s response: sinus tach, PEA (pulseless electrical activity), asystole (no heart 
rhythm at all). The hours feel like 50, and are exhausting, both physically and 
emotionally. The code’s minutes are recorded, and responses to each intervention are 
described. And for what? Like recording the final moments of a person’s agonal electrical 
heart signals, there is questionable utility in examining the minutiae of death. Codes, by 
any measure, go horribly wrong almost every time: The patient dies or is “saved” only to 
stave off death for another relatively brief amount of time—days or months. In the cases 
where the codes last for hours, all present know the outcome, and it is grim. In one 
scenario, a young patient’s sepsis evolved into disseminated intervascular coagulation, 
and she was actively spontaneously hemorrhaging. Because of her youth, and because 
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there seemed no other choice, we resuscitated multiple times. Every time we would 
regain a heartbeat, the drugs in her system would wane within half an hour. We feel 
desperate, knowing and dreading the outcome, while simultaneously feeling resigned to it 
once it becomes clear that there will be no recovery. Code blues are spectacularly rotten 
at saving anybody. And yet. And yet they sometimes do, but very rarely, under very 
specific circumstances. 
For the family, it is a different liminal experience; they may know there is not 
going to be a recovery, but each minute feels so precious that they want to hang on to 
each and every one they share. There is evidence to support a family’s presence during 
resuscitation—their witnessing of this event appears to help them come to terms with the 
death, with fewer bereavement-related symptoms (MacLean et al. 2003; Meyers, 
Eichhorn, & Guzzetta, 1998). In some hospitals, there are support staff on hand, such as 
social workers, to be with the family at such a time. However, in our hospital, it is a nurse 
who will stand with the family, either simply being there with them or explaining what is 
happening. They stand at the edge of the organized chaos, appearing shell-shocked, 
watching their family member, hopeful of a good outcome. For the nurse, there is the 
teetering upon that precipice, the wondering, all the while performing CPR (which really 
gives the provider time to reflect on the nature of the exercise, for their job is to pivot at 
the waist and compress another human’s chest, over and over, looking at her or his dead, 
blue, sometimes bleeding face), wondering at what point it can be agreed upon that there 
is no point. We “run a code” as many times as those involved see any effect of the 
interventions. Unless there is a family member who declares that we have done enough, 
and we can allow the patient to die.  
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There is a scene from the war novel Catch-22 (Heller, 1961/1994), where the 
main character, Yossarian, reassures a seriously wounded soldier, Snowden, that 
everything will be alright. Yossarian sees the wound the young soldier has acquired 
during battle, on his leg, and starts to pour upon it small packets of sulfanilamide—a 
powdered antibiotic found in government-issued first aid kits—as, certainly, some 
directive would have him do. Yossarian steels himself to apply a tourniquet, “with 
simulated skill and composure” (p. 336), muttering, “There, there. There, there” (p. 337) 
to Snowden’s frail and repeated complaints that he is cold. Yossarian persists with trying 
to treat the leg wound, cutting open the pant leg, pressing a cotton compress to the site, 
all the while watching Snowden appear more and more pale, his leg waxy, his lips blue. It 
is then Yossarian sees “a strangely colored stain seeping through the coveralls just above 
the armhole of Snowden’s flak suit” (p. 338) and discovers that Snowden is wounded 
profoundly and irreversibly. Yossarian’s use of the powdered antibiotic is ridiculous and 
tragic in its utter futility, and the devastation of the wound is fully understood:  
It was easy to read the message in his entrails. Man was matter, that was 
Snowden’s secret. Drop him out a window and he’ll fall. Set fire to him and he’ll 
burn. Bury him and he’ll rot, like other kinds of garbage. The spirit gone, man is 
garbage. That was Snowden’s secret. Ripeness was all. (p. 339) 
I am reminded of this scene because the code blue is arguably the most visceral of the 
attempts to revive being, and is largely a frustrating venture into delusion—we’re pouring 
tiny packets of sulfanilamide onto gaping wounds made by forces over which we have no 
control. The difference is that we nurses, unlike Yossarian, know about the gaping wound 
under the flak suit. Nevertheless, we push on, pushing drugs, pushing on a chest. The 
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body is done, whether or not the spirit is too. It feels perverted, paradoxical to run 
through a code blue where the cure is most certainly worse than the ailment because it 
will not, cannot work. One may argue that while there is life there may still be hope for 
life to continue on, but I disagree. There is a difference between the heart having an 
arrhythmia problem and needing a pop of electricity to reset the beats and contractions to 
pump blood around the body and the scenario where the body is slowly, piece-by-piece, 
falling apart, so that the last flicker of life is what can be seen on a monitor that does not 
reflect the potential of time alive for that patient. The body is already falling out the 
window, burning, rotten. We cannot catch coding patients any more than the whisp of air 
moving in and out of their lungs with our hands. And in this endeavor so benignly called 
a “code blue,” we have failed before we even begin.  
 It’s not within the scope of this paper to discuss how patients become ill in the 
first place. There is ample discussion in the literature on the health of patients and 
populations. What I do know is that by the time someone is nearly dead in the hospital, 
there is very little we can do about it, and yet we very often try, with the cost of trying 
having detrimental effects to our cynicism. A patient’s loved ones struggle with issues 
that they perhaps have been able to ignore for much of their lives—issues such as 
mortality and expectations from their hospital experience. Hilberman, Kutner, Parsons, 
and Murphy (1997) note, in their paper on the efficacy of cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
(CPR), that “outcomes from [CPR] remain distressingly poor. Overuse of CPR is 
attributable to unrealistic expectations, unintended consequences of existing policies and 
failure to honour patient refusal of CPR” (p. 361). The paradoxes of life and death, 
emotionality and rationality, hope and futility are all functions or products of the liminal 
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space. The patient and family are in limbo, trying to navigate and renegotiate the 
outcome. In the code I explored involving the young woman for whom I was primary 
nurse, there was additionally the paradox of youth and vitality and sudden death. It was 
absurd that she should die. It is nearly irreconcilable for someone to be alive and 
exuberant one moment and hours later dead.  The nursing staff shared her journey that 
night, and had to humbly acknowledge that we could not prevent the final catastrophe. 
These are situations that test your foundation—your own philosophies on the 
meaning of your work. When you join the patient in his or her journey from illness to 
death, you begin to see the pattern of the signposts directing the way to the end. Only 
occasionally do we see an abrupt condition (a sudden death by arrhythmia or respiratory 
failure) that, if caught immediately, can resolve with a swift—although often somewhat 
violent—interception. More common is the patient plagued with chronic afflictions that 
grow in number until the body is overcome and simply gives out.  
Atul Gawande speaks to this in Being Mortal (2014), saying that “instead of just 
delaying the moment of the downward drop, our treatments can stretch the descent out 
until it ends up looking less like a cliff and more like a hilly road down the mountain” (p. 
27). He goes on to accurately note that patients “enter the hospital looking terrible, and 
some of what we do can make them look worse” (p. 27). There are, undeniably, ways to 
stave off death for indeterminate amounts of time (sometimes months, sometimes days, 
and sometimes only hours), but the larger story is that patients and families wish for 
interventions that will provide endless hope for perpetual cobbling, with the 
dream/desperate delusion for the Shangri-La of the permanent fix or cure, ever just 
around the corner. The nurse must operate between the hope of the patient and her or his 
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family on one hand and the physician who is doling out the interventions on the other. 
Often, the interventions seem absurd to the nurse, whose job it is to shuttle the critical 
patient from test to test within the hospital or provide resuscitative measures if the patient 
succumbs to long-standing, chronic conditions. I do not wish to make my position a 
critique of the physician, who must navigate as she or he can also between offering the 
possibilities of modern medicine to treat and offering the possibilities of palliation which 
can be complicated and difficult to discuss. Discussing how the physician is prepared 
during his or her education—medically and philosophically—for these conversations is 
not within the scope of this paper. However, I do believe that differences of perspective 
are perpetuated by the proximity of physical care. The difference is caring for those 
whose bodies are disintegrating under your hands versus managing care from the 
doorway, directing the interventions without having to face the physical crisis.  
Another author (of another war novel, incidentally), Charles Yale Harrison, wrote 
Generals Die in Bed (1930/1975), describing a context of war occurring with distinct sets 
of participants who have differing perspectives, ostensibly because of their exposure (or 
lack of) to the brutality of war. Generals are seen as being unaware (at best) or 
unconcerned (at worst) with the realities of the trenches. The unnamed protagonist in the 
novel becomes more and more disillusioned about the goals of the war, presuming the 
generals are apathetic, seeing the soldiers as pawns or a means-to-an-end, with the end 
being suspiciously economically driven. I acknowledge that there were certainly generals 
who were also present at the war fronts, in the trenches, along with the soldiers, with a 
hearty and visceral understanding of the effects of combat. However, there remains a 
perception disconnect between those issuing orders (generals), and those who are obliged 
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to obey (soldiers) that runs parallel to a medical context of doctors and nurses. Doctors 
issue orders; nurses are obliged to carry out those orders. It is this liminal intersection that 
provide fertile ground for such issues as “moral distress,” a much-discussed phenomenon 
in current nursing literature that will be examined here as well.  
Martino (2010), writing about Slaughterhouse Five, notes that “Camusian 
absurdity and Bergsonian humour rely on the same basic principles: a lack, a separation, 
between action and meaning, so that the expected outcome of a course of action is 
subverted” (p. 5). There certainly is the separation here, between the action (attempts to 
revive) and the meaning (those attempts are generally futile, so what does the attempt 
mean?), sometimes making an entire code blue an exercise of acting, of propping only. 
Many arrests in the ICU are anticipated, as in the case where a patient is horribly ill but 
family members continue to pursue aggressive treatment despite the (obvious to nurses) 
writing on the wall. This is a liminal space for multiple reasons. First there is a clear 
border as to what is considered an arrest: the heart stops beating effectively—although it 
can occur for a variety of causes, this is the punctuating event that defines a code blue. 
Second, there are rituals and expected procedures that take place that the community (of 
health care professionals) are aware of, agree to, and provide. However, because it’s a 
community-initiated ritual, it has some elements of negotiation. When the arrest is 
anticipated, the result is inevitably that the efforts will fail, yet the family insists that a 
code be run, the medical staff (doctors, respiratory therapists, as well as nurses) may 
negotiate in this way: They will run a code while understanding that it will fail. This is 
unofficially called a “Hollywood code,” or a “slow code,” meaning either it is acting 
only, or that the code is run slowly enough to allow the patient to die sooner. There is the 
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acknowledgement that the enterprise is useless and the attempt is acted out anyway out of 
respect for the family’s wishes. We are legally culpable if we do not follow a “Full Code” 
order, as though the outcome could be that the patient will survive an arrest if only they 
have some intervening therapies. In the slow code, the chest is still compressed, the drugs 
are still given, the minutes still tabulated, but any sense of urgency is absent. In fact, there 
are often quite cynical comments that may occur, reflecting the frustration with the 
situation. There is no problem-solving happening, no running through what may have 
caused the arrest—it is already known: The patient has come to the end of what her or his 
body can do. And the nurse may even resent the traumatic injury he or she must cause by 
compressing the chest, feeling the pop of ribs breaking under one’s hands. Yet we are 
stuck in between.  
Goldman (2014) speaks to the liminal spaces, although his book, called The 
Secret Language of Doctors, is technically about a hidden language— the one used in the 
“Bunker” (p. 1)— that doctors and other medical staff use to speak to each other. 
However, although he writes about language, there are physical and philosophical spaces 
that run under or between the doctors and the “outside world.” The liminal nature of this 
different language exists in the way it is developed, shared, and where it is used. It is 
forged within a liminal space— the space where cultural norms are negotiated, as 
described by Turner. Goldman describes a paper titled “Beyond curriculum reform: 
Confronting medicine’s hidden curriculum,” written by Hafferty (1998), a director of the 
Program in Professionalism and Ethics at the Mayo Clinic in Minnesota:  
Hafferty wrote that the hidden curriculum is passed from student to student and 
from resident to resident not in the classroom but ‘outside formally identified 
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learning environments: in the elevator, the corridor, the lounge, the cafeteria, or 
the on-call room.’ (p. 13) 
In other words, the in-between spaces in the hospital, away from patients.  
So the slow code, the Hollywood code, is a small way for the nurse to mitigate the 
harm done to the dying. The experienced nurse seems to decide whether this code can 
have any positive effect or outcome, weighs the patient’s comorbidities against the reason 
she or he “coded” in the first place, and is willing to abandon the project before it even 
begins. In my own experience, it feels the worst when the patient, already almost dead, is 
actually revived briefly. This means rapid drug delivery, the making of new drug IV 
tubing and mixed bags of varied concentrations of drugs, higher detailed tabulation, and 
hopeful family members who often see this as a sign that their loved one may recover. 
This experience feels like extensive packing and preparing for a trip that no one will ever 
take, and the nurse may meet the demands with virtual eye-rolling. Why bother? Why do 
a tracheotomy on a patient who will not recover? Why prolong the long-drawn-out death? 
Why do CPR on a patient who has looked literally dead for a month already? Why shuttle 
the patient to have a CT scan 4 floors away, bringing four other staff members along (two 
alone to move the bed), taking resources like time and attention away from other equally 
needing, very alive patients? Occasionally there is a case made by the family to postpone 
the death of their loved one because there is a far-away family member expected to arrive 
to the bedside, to say goodbye. But more often there is only the very temporary staving 
off of death for the sake of hoping that death will wait indefinitely. If family are present 
during a code blue, the family may understand, eventually, that their loved one is not 
going to benefit from another round of CPR and cell-jolting drugs or electricity. It is then 
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that they (sometimes) agree to stop the interventions and they agree to “allow natural 
death”—an order that, in some hospitals, must actually be issued by a doctor (rather than 
letting the family decide and a nurse, say, proceeding with their wishes). The order to 
“allow natural death,” also called an A-N-D order, is like a sigh to the nurse— a 
recognition of mortality, that we do not have to pretend we will win the war we are 
waging against death and we can stop “packing” like we are going to. Instead, we can 
make the patient comfortable, pull up chairs for the family members, and provide peace 
and reverence for the dying. 
 I recognize that there is a pragmatism that may come across as callous, but the 
frustration and impatience with the process are what push the nurse to a liminal space 
without a way to move conversations about the eventuality of the body failing. Hafferty 
(1998), in his article, points out that “analyzing the hidden curriculum is neither easy nor 
free from controversy. What is revealed by such an analysis may appear decidedly 
strange, shocking, or outlandish to outsiders” (p. 405). Indeed, sometimes the nurses’ 
resistance or despair with implementing what she or he considers inappropriately violent 
futile care is met with frustration by doctors, who may have a very different perspective. 
Susan Sontag (1978) describes in Illness as Metaphor, the withholding of realistic 
prognoses to patients (although in her description the doctors are more forthcoming with 
the patient’s family):  
All this lying to and by cancer patients is a measure of how much harder it has 
become in advanced industrial societies to come to terms with death. As death is 
now an offensively meaningless event, so that disease widely considered a 
synonym for death is experienced as something to hide. (p. 8)  
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While Sontag is specifically describing a diagnosis of cancer, I would suggest that there 
is often a lack of transparency regarding many conditions’ prognoses, allowing families 
(and patients, if they can be part of that conversation) to believe they are progressing 
better than they are. There are phrases used by doctors that are actually euphemisms, 
since their meaning is so much harsher than the words suggest. Phrases such as “guarded 
prognosis” are used, meaning the doctor expects the patient to die. However, this term is 
meaningless to families, who may think, “okay, the prognosis is guarded, but the doctor 
did not say it was terrible.” Sontag links these (in her words) lies with the shame attached 
to a particular disease. I wonder, as technology and our ability to respond medically have 
progressed, if death is not seen as something that could not be staved off for good, 
irrespective of the cause. We have multiple families asking if their loved one’s failed or 
failing organs could not just be switched out with a donor, say a liver, a heart, even a 
brain. Strictly speaking, yes, receiving a donated organ can happen, but only under very 
specific circumstances. Once a person is very sick, there is no feasible way to survive the 
process. Especially when the patient has sometimes minutes to live. These are 
conversations with the desperate, casting at any possibility, trying to problem-solve 
without knowing how the problem works. The nurse is in the middle, having to navigate 
conversations with language she is fluent in, remembering the patients and family are not, 
having to interpret accurately, gently, truthfully, what the doctor is saying.  
Throughout this, the nurse may be having a psychic battle, sometimes becoming 
entrenched in the position that it is unethical to provide treatment that she or he deems 
profoundly inappropriate. Conversations are even murkier to navigate under these 
circumstances. The doctors, who often assume a heroic posture, want to save patients 
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from dying—they may see it as their moral imperative. Buchman, Cassell, Ray, and Wax 
(2002) describe the strange intersection of heroism and shame experienced by the 
surgical physician in their article “Who Should Manage the Dying Patient? Rescue, 
Shame, and the Surgical ICU Dilemma.” They describe surgeons as “trained to hold 
themselves entirely accountable for the outcomes of their patients” (p. 665), where 
patient prognosis is an unacceptable reason to withhold intervention. This article 
identifies the paradox of the ambitious doctor—the authors ask, “Who, after all, would 
choose to be operated on by an indecisive or ambivalent surgeon?” (p. 666). The 
difficulty comes when the patient is dying but the physician will not recognize—at least, 
to the family—that the attempt to cure is not working. The authors describe nurses as 
“culture brokers” (p. 667), who navigate conversations between patients, families, and 
doctors. If there is disagreement as to the expectations of the outcome for the patient, 
when there is little chance of recovery, “the critical care nurse cannot succeed as culture 
broker” (p. 667). The authors suggest that this communication and alliance often 
“unravels near the end of the patient’s life” (p. 667), leaving the nurse to view her 
position as “powerless,” and “ineffective” (p. 667), the upshot of which leads to 
frustration and professional exhaustion. The response of individual nurses is often to 
withdraw from the challenges of ethical decision making, creating further disengagement 
with conversations that may help patients and families navigate between hopeful and 
realistic expectations. I would add that, in my personal experience, these repeated 
scenarios have the frightening potential to erode nurses’ humanity. This is why there is 
the cynical response to a code blue where the nurse understands that there cannot be 
success by any measure. This dissonance is what fuels the moral distress that affects most 
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ICU nurses to some degree, primarily because they are asked to “continue to participate 
in care for [a] hopelessly ill person who is being sustained on a ventilator, when no one 
will make a decision to ‘pull the plug’” (Elpern, Covert, & Kleinpell, 2005, p. 523).  
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CHAPTER THREE: NURSING FUTILITY—AN EXERCISE IN LIMINALITY 
In a Canada-wide survey, 95% of nurses polled claimed their ICU provided futile 
care (Palda, Bowman, McLean & Chapman, 2005). The impact of caring for a patient for 
whom care would be described by the nurse as “futile” is that the nurse often unwillingly 
cultivates an opinion on the appropriateness of her or his role in the patient’s care. If the 
care is considered futile, and the procedures of the daily rituals that go along with the 
patient’s care are painful and difficult, the nurse may consider her part in that care to be 
complicit with inhumane treatment driven by either the family or physicians by 
participating in hurting the patient.  
Described initially by a nurse philosopher, Andrew Jameton (1993), moral 
distress is the response when the nurse cannot provide the care that is consistent with 
“deeply held ethical values, principles or moral commitments” (McCarthy & Gastmans, 
2015, p. 132). Most often, it is the feeling the nurse has when she or he is faced with 
carrying out or being witness to treatment which is considered futile. The concept was 
recognized and explored in the 1980s and has since been developed and researched 
extensively, leading to knowledge of its triggers, manifestations, and implications for not 
only the nurse but the patient, the patient’s family, and the institutions in which the nurse 
operates (De Villers & DeVon, 2012). Reading about moral distress, however, I am 
reminded of how Robert Sapolsky, a neuroendocrinologist and author, describes in The 
Trouble with Testosterone (1997) returning to work after his father has passed away. He 
is distracted and “bludgeoned by emotions that swirled around a numb core of unreality” 
(p. 93). When he is asked by someone he works with, a medical student, how he feels, he 
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replies, “Well, today it seems as if I must have imagined it all,” to which she replies, 
“That makes sense …. Don’t forget about DABDA.” 
What her shorthand is referring to are the stages of grief, as plotted by psychiatrist 
Elizabeth Kubler-Ross (Kubler-Ross, Kessler, & Shriver, 2014), who recognized a 
pattern of predictable stages one passes through (and revisits) after personal loss: denial, 
anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance, in this case colloquially known as 
DABDA. What struck Sapolsky was how easily he fit into an acronym memorized by 
medical students to rattle off expected phases of grief. He wonders,  
We cry, we rage, we demand that the oceans’ waves stop, that the planets halt 
their movements in the sky, all because the earth will no longer be graced by the 
one who sang lullabies as no one else could; yet that, too, is reducible to 
DABDA” (p. 95).  
Sapolsky could as easily be speaking about moral distress and the nurse’s response to it.  
I hope to draw parallels with the emotional response to looking after a patient who 
triggers deep moral distress but am aware that, by comparing these ideas, I may be 
minimizing the agonizing grief someone feels for a lost loved one. There is a disconnect 
between the benign-sounding phrase moral distress and its definition and the emotion one 
feels about it—again there is a gulf between the two ideas that appears irreconcilable.  I 
wish to convey that the feelings connected with caring for a patient for whom care is 
considered futile are conflicted, grueling, and the cause of great frustration and anger and 
yet can be seemingly summed up with two words: moral distress.  When the nurse is 
expected to pretend to anticipate a positive outcome that experience tells her is 
impossible, it feels like the term moral distress could be renamed moral outrage. 
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 It is a common picture: Two nurses sit by their desk outside a patient’s door at 
change of shift—one giving, and one receiving report on the patient. There are 
spontaneous (quiet) outbursts of, “oh my god, what for?” when being told that the patient 
is going to get a tracheostomy to replace the endotracheal tube (which can only stay in 
situ for approximately two weeks before it can do irreversible damage to the vocal cords 
and is therefore replaced by the more permanent and invasive but long-term 
tracheostomy), with the other nurse nodding, saying, “I know, I know,” because we all 
do. We know what this looks like—the patient who not only has terminal end-stage 
cancer but now has a terrible pneumonia and is requiring a level of care that feels not 
only inappropriate but absurd. The patient and family’s position is often intractable: “I 
want to live,” the patient says, as though that is enough explanation, and the nurse 
understands the wish, because who does not? However, when the choices for treatment 
feel to the nurse to have reached unreasonable levels and costs—physical, financial, and 
emotional—any extended time alive is a Pyrrhic victory. So one can talk about moral 
distress, but until you are faced with the person whom you are to, paradoxically, care for, 
it is difficult to convey the depth of the outrage and the acute futility of the treatments, 
especially to a family who wish only to have their hope reflected and buoyed by yours. 
Perhaps nurses experience a parallel emotion via moral distress while the patient’s family 
is experiencing anticipatory grieving, but I wonder how this gulf, too, could be crossed.  
Another typical scenario: A colleague is at a social gathering outside of work with 
a group of friends, but also present are some she does not know. We nurses often talk 
about our experiences such as this at work, telling the group, where we find a common 
understanding. The oft-recounted situation goes like this: A nurse tells us she is asked by 
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a young man present at this function what her job is and she tells him that she is an ICU 
nurse. He is immediately fascinated. He asks, enthusiastically, “What is the weirdest or 
just grossest thing you’ve ever seen?” She retells the conversation, her face alight when 
mimicking the man—he seems to be waiting for a gory answer, perhaps to uphold some 
notion of an ICU nurse managing guts and bleeding eyeballs. However, the party-
attending nurse’s affect goes flat when she retells her answer. She shakes her head, and 
retells: “You don’t want to know what we do to people. He was like, ‘oh you mean guts 
and stuff?’ and I said, no, the worst is looking after people who are basically dead, 
keeping them here, like this.” She gestures around her now at the patient rooms, 
containing people who are generally elderly but all frail, not expected to recover, yet 
receiving full, aggressive treatment. She says, now turning to us, those who are living this 
experience also: “These people we’re keeping alive—look at them! It’s horrible! This is 
the worst thing I have ever seen.” We laugh, because we know the reply: “But isn’t there, 
like, some chance they’ll recover? Like, they might, right?” Again, her expression flat, 
“Nope. You don’t get it, at all.” She says to the group now, “Nobody gets it except for 
us!” laughing again. This is the liminal space—one which is not generally recognized by 
these nurses as a liminal space—we have simply learned not to share because “nobody 
understands.” 
To be fair, there are cases in which frail elderly patients recover from pneumonia, 
get extubated (breathing tube removed), and recover enough to be moved from our ICU. 
However, it is not so much the unlikelihood that they will recover, but the continual 
discomfort the nurse inflicts and the feeling that that leaves with us. Indeed there are 
medications that may assuage the pain of being a gravely ill patient, but it is the nurse 
                                                                                                                          62 
 
 
 
whose imperative it is to care that will hurt the patient frequently throughout his or her 
shift. We must balance the salve with its unintended effects, which may actually cause 
their demise. So the salve (pain medication, sedative, or a combination of soothing 
medications) must be given judiciously, lest we need to run a code blue.  
Never lose hope: It is an oft-used phrase by families, but is an awful argument 
against continuing what is tantamount to torture. And yet, families use this line of 
reasoning to have us carry on mopping up oozing wounds, apologizing for causing pain, 
restraining arms for days—sometimes weeks—on end to prevent the patient from taking 
matters into her or his own hands (and removing tubes and wires from his or her own 
body), and nurses are stuck in the middle.  
 We fall apart one part at a time, as Atul Gawande (2014) notes. What the nurse 
wishes for are conversations about treatment that explain the cost of those treatments. 
And it is not the financial cost that is most bothersome, it is the physical and emotional 
cost—it is when the family member looks at a loved one and says, “hey, they look better 
today,” and all the nurse sees is a bruised, swollen, bleeding, dying, suffering human in 
the bed whom she must keep alive rather than comfort and allow to feel release. Again, 
there is that liminal zone of existence where the nurse inhabits a region between. We are 
stuck between life and death, explaining the inexplicable, sharing the unsharable, holding 
a life just this side of death yet not allowing the person to actually die lest we inflict 
traumatic injuries such as breaking ribs to save them. It doesn’t make any sense, it is 
ridiculous. Incredibly, here we reside.  
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Liminality and humour—trickster, the body grotesque 
Tricia Scott notes in her paper about humour in sudden deathwork that humour is 
prominent where situations have particular elements: incongruity, the absurd, the 
unexpected, and the inappropriate (2007). It is no wonder, then, that humour flourishes in 
an ICU, as it contains all of these elements—in abundance. Humour is an integral part of 
nursing, and its unhinged nature is recognized by other nurses as having a pervasive 
quality—almost anything is fair game for a laugh. Established norms and rituals, equally 
part of liminal spaces, are recognized by the nurse participants and are the ingredients 
necessary for the joke to occur. The joke becomes the shorthand for a larger statement.  
It has been said that any joke that requires explaining will no longer be funny, but 
at the risk of extinguishing anything humourous about the following scenarios, I feel 
there should be some acknowledgement of exactly what is funny and where the 
incongruences reside. 
One example, a snapshot: I am sitting in front of my patient’s room, looking at 
him, intubated, comatose, a wreck. I can see by various measures that he will die, likely 
within the next 24 hours, yet his family hold out hope that he will not only survive that 
but recover and restore health. Again, I will reiterate that this could describe too many of 
my patients. There is a disconnect between a family’s hopes and expectations and reality. 
So, we continue to provide uncomfortable treatment. The patient’s abdomen is bloated 
like a frog on its back, and I know he’s quietly oozing fluid from various holes under his 
crisp white sheet that’s draped over him, and he will need cleaning shortly (his abdomen 
is full of fluid—each attempt to manage this by drainage with a long needle has resulted 
in a hole, and each hole now leaks). His limbs, above the sheets, and face, visible in the 
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dimmed light, are yellow and gaunt. His teeth are the most prominent feature as his skin 
has seemingly shrunk on his skull. His eyes are half open, mouth agape. To the 
uninitiated, he looks horrific. Even those used to this kind of scenario often find care 
difficult. Many nurses have voiced their frustration with looking after such patients, so 
broken and irretrievable are they. I search for a picture on the internet—one which I 
suddenly realize, while looking into the room, looks uncannily like my patient. The 
picture is of John Torrington, a member of the Franklin expedition, still in his frozen 
grave. His body and face have been remarkably preserved in the permafrost, where he 
could almost be mistaken for simply lying down and looking horrible, with a rictus of the 
nearly dead, yet remaining alive. And I think (not for the first time): I am caring for a 
corpse. However, my patient really is alive, with an unmeasurable degree of feeling (we 
assume feeling is intact and try to sedate and provide soothing drugs accordingly, as 
much as we can while balancing its cost in blood pressure). My response to this situation 
is weird and inappropriate, but it simultaneously behaves like a salve. To care for a truly 
long-dead person would be absurd, but to consider that my patient is still alive within this 
juxtaposition—no matter how corpse-like he is—allows me to view the scenario more 
tenderly. A picture of a man, frozen and long dead, stated the volumes that are 
inadequately and unsatisfyingly discussed—or rather, there may be discussion by the 
nurses in the form of angry indignation that we must nurse someone with the intent to fix 
when there is quite obviously a zero percent chance of that fix occurring. There is no 
point, generally, to articulate to each other how difficult it is to look after such cases, 
because it is already agreed. However, the futile care continues, in spite of nurses’ 
attempts to have meaningful conversations with physicians, patients, and the patients’ 
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families, and in some ways has not advanced whatsoever in spite of the literature growing 
to support addressing the issue. So this is the kind of humour we find. I would deny that 
this constitutes a laughing at, however—not at the patient, because he or she is, by all 
accounts, the literal voiceless—we are gentle and are as kind as we can be. If anything, 
the patient’s pain serves to make us angrier—angry at the doctors who promise hope and 
health; we are angry at families themselves for hoping and believing, in our opinion 
delusionally, that their loved one will be the one to survive, against all odds. We can be 
cynical and sharp, and sometimes—the best of times—this morphs into humour. I show 
the picture to a coworker, also a close friend, who is charting a few desks away. He 
laughs, and then I laugh too. There is no explanation needed; he “gets it” immediately. 
The situation is absurd, then suddenly sad and hilarious.   
Kurt Vonnegut, American novelist, was known for his satirical take on war and 
bittersweet take on the human experience. His character from Slaughterhouse Five 
(1969/1975), Billy Pilgrim, who experiences (and reexperiences) war, finds himself 
inexplicably upset by a song performed by a barbershop quartet. Pilgrim is mystified as 
to why he is suddenly emotionally crippled because of a song that “made slow agonized 
experiments with chords—chords  intentionally sour, sourer and still unbearably sour, 
and then a chord that was suffocatingly sweet, and then some sour ones again” (p. 173). 
The lyrics, sentimental, go: “So long forever, old fellows and gals, so long forever old 
sweethearts and pals- God bless’em” (p. 172). Billy Pilgrim “had supposed for years that 
he had no secrets from himself” (p. 173). While Pilgrim cries in other places in the book, 
he does so silently. This time his face is contorted with grief, he is overcome—others in 
his presence believe him to be having a heart attack. They do not guess that his grief 
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could be summoned by something sweet—that chords conjuring pleasure could conjure 
pain. What he had not recognized in himself, perhaps, is how linked his experiences are. 
This may be what Vonnegut himself asks the reader to reflect upon by having Pilgrim 
thrust back and forth in his life. Is this not how one lives? In memory, we are thrust, 
sometimes unwillingly, to a meaningful moment—sometimes meaningful only in its 
banality. Pilgrim time-hops throughout various points in his life, literally reliving what he 
has already been witness to. In a Sisyphusian/Camusian chain of events, he is stuck 
rolling his boulder up the mountain, again and again, and perhaps this point when he 
hears the barbershop quartet is some kind of collision of his experience. I would argue the 
ICU nurse experiences something similar—the blurring of patients, reexperiencing bodies 
that are simultaneously unique and all the same, sometimes returning to those 
experiences that are particularly sweet. Or awful. Frommer (2005) considers these 
paradoxes in his paper considering the liminal space of mortality and says,  
dread and anticipatory mourning may exist alongside the paradoxical 
consequence that an intensified awareness of one’s own mortality can make 
everything feel both meaningless and extraordinarily meaningful, sometimes 
leading to the conviction that one’s life is truly one’s own, and to being able to 
actually live it as if it were. (p. 484)  
Mirth and levity live quite comfortably alongside sadness and tragedy, and often 
in unexpected ways. In line with the paradoxes that are present in marginal places, 
situations are highly charged and can flow “positive” or “negative” and flip without 
warning. Patients—especially young ones—can look surprisingly hale until they are 
ready to “crash.” Very often the patient is the first to have a feeling that something isn’t 
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quite right, but sometimes we have patients or families who, perhaps by some coping 
mechanism, are incongruously lighthearted in the face of imminent physical danger. We 
have had patients who were unsuspecting of how sick they were prior to their 
admission—or at least, shrugged and were agreeable to our treatments as though they 
could do without them but approached all procedures as though they were simply 
humouring us. Chipper demeanors sometimes belie the fatal processes that roll, 
unchecked, in their systems, anecdotally most often in the young. Similarly, family 
members may nudge their elbows at each other and roll their eyes congenially, 
approaching the patient who is intubated and gravely ill. It is too big to understand, 
sometimes, that the good health that was experienced so recently is now gone, and 
sometimes for good.  
Rituals may guide the process—the code blue algorithms, the chairs placed at the 
bedside, the privacy given the grieving—but it is still the first time the patient and family 
participants are experiencing this process. They are painfully living the process. Nurses 
inhabit this space, and while it is not the nurse’s pain, we are witness to some of a 
family’s worst moments. The nurse is what Turner would label “liminal personae” (1969, 
p. 95), literally people who inhabit the liminal space. And this sets the nurse apart, even 
from her or his own family. We are present while someone else’s family capsizes. But 
there is a pragmatism that goes with being witness to that, or perhaps, more accurately, a 
kind of desensitization. When I began working in the ICU, I heard a quip that came from 
a seasoned nurse about her patient about whom she was very concerned. Looking at me, 
she said, matter-of-factly, “He’s got one foot in the grave and one on a banana peel.” She 
delivered the line deadpan, and it was clear she was not joking, even though the image 
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was supposedly comical. Constant exposure inures us, to some degree, to the effects of 
tragedy, perhaps in the way that tragedy plus time equal comedy. And for the nurse, it 
doesn’t take much time at all to see the humour. It is, perhaps, this desensitization that 
allows the development of humour and levity in the midst of tragedy and darkness. We 
are eager to flip the switch, to feel mirth, to savour our own living.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: WHAT’S SO FUNNY ABOUT DEATH?  
Ring the bells that still can ring 
Forget your perfect offering 
There is a crack, a crack in everything 
That’s how the light gets in.  
—Leonard Cohen (1992) 
At first glance, it may seem grossly inappropriate to find levity in a realm of 
sobriety and somber grief. However, this is not an ordinary space of loss and sadness. It 
is a liminal space, where the culture is constructed by its inhabitants, and those 
inhabitants are part of events that are far outside the experience of most. There is a 
trickster at work here, and the nurse becomes inured to the unexpected, and often there is 
the suspicion that the worst is yet to come. No nurse will say these words out loud 
without being soundly chided by her peers or expecting all hell to break loose any 
minute: “It sure is quiet today.” We are mildly superstitious about declaring it a quiet 
shift, but also sometimes of full moons, we will often say that two deaths in succession 
herald a third, and for some nurses even a patient’s impending birthday is cause for 
bracing against calamity, seeing a birthday as some completion, perhaps, of an invisible 
circle about to close. I would like to differentiate humour from superstition, but also 
would like to note that I believe they both are manifestations of residing in a workplace 
that can be extremely unpredictable. Instead of growing resistant and inflexible, the nurse 
can grow fatalistic and accepting that there are forces at work that are beyond our control, 
managing some unpredictability with routines. Routines, as discussed previously as 
congruous with Turner’s description of liminal space, may be things like monitoring vital 
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signs at regular intervals, documentation of anything out-of-the-ordinary, as well as 
having training on how to respond should someone need swift medical intervention.  
Somehow, this is a place where laughter may be triggered by things that do not 
seem all that funny: a burst ostomy bag, a liquid bowel movement so large it streams off 
the bed like a muddy river, a large, awkward cleaning buggy brought to a code blue 
instead of a similarly large and awkward crash cart—mistaken by a new nurse who, in 
her panic, was blind to the difference. It could be confused patients who have pulled out 
their own arterial line, and their frustrated nurse calls for help “to the murder scene” (as 
there can be a lot of bright red arterial splash on everything) that is met with laughter 
from peers as they help stabilize the patient. Jokes described are rarely funny, but their 
effect on the demeanor of the staff is palpable. Awful events and tragic situations must be 
followed by some release.  
 But there is something more happening with humour—there is more going on 
than what one sees at first glance. Humour is explored in the literature to some degree, 
but it seems to be often only to categorize or examine whether it is appropriate or not. 
One article on humour heads one of its paragraphs discussing the topic with the title, 
“Hospital Humour Explained” (Aultman, 2009), suggesting that it is all simple, really. It 
then goes on to describe how complex and complicated the actual topic is, breaking it 
down into multiple theories including “incongruity theory,” “relief theory,” and 
“superiority theory” (p. 228), and listing attributes of various types of humor, such as 
“black humor,” “cynical,” “derogatory,” “gallows humor,” “humor,” and “satire” (p. 
228). The title Hospital Humour Explained belies its complexity.  
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Humour is sometimes seen as a risk. Often the humour examined in the literature 
is thought to be a possible detriment to the patient or, at least, encouraging stereotypes 
and posing a threat to the empathic care of a vulnerable population (Aultman, 2009; 
Wear, Aultman, Zarconi, & Varley, 2009), as though where there is humour and laughter, 
there is likely derisive humour and laughter. And I suppose that’s possible, but in my 
personal experience, much of the humour I witness is a manifestation of the frustrations 
experienced by nurses. Being witness, repeatedly, to the human experience of sickness 
and death changes one’s sense of what’s humorous. There, but for the grace of god, go I 
is often the view of the nurse, looking at her or his patient. And often we literally do “go 
there”: Being a community hospital, our intensive care unit has had our own staff and 
their direct family members as patients. In my 17 years in my current workplace, a loose 
mental count tallies at least half a dozen ICU staff or their family members as ICU 
patients at some point. We see ourselves in the bed, yet it is not ourselves. Again, this 
idea of paradox echoes the liminal, with nurses living on the threshold of those 
experiences. We earn our unique sense of humour, perhaps, through the discomfort of 
recognizing ourselves on the other side of the equation, made glaring for me, personally, 
when, for example, the patient has the same birth year. Watson (2011) writes on gallows 
humour in medicine and notes Freud’s take on the matter, stating that from a Freudian 
perspective, “a joke is a rebellion against oppressive authority, and few authorities are 
more oppressive than death, illness, and injury” (p. 41).  
However, the notion that humour is most likely to be derogatory may actually be 
a reflection of what is considered acceptable, especially from predominantly female 
nurses. Nurses may be expected to simply serve and be kind, not have any kind of 
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commentary about the care they are expected to give and under what circumstances. It is 
interesting that one researcher discovered that breaking from the expected stereotype of 
the good nurse is what made the nurses she was studying laugh (Adams, 2007). While 
conducting research for her doctoral dissertation on aged care nurses and their perception 
of their care, Adams “discovered that nurses laughed when saying anything that could be 
interpreted as their not being ‘good nurses’” (p. 3). Perhaps our acknowledgement of the 
incongruence between what we feel we should be doing and what we are doing falls 
under such a category. Moral distress would, by definition, certainly qualify as being a 
state in which the nurse does not believe he or she is being a “good nurse,” and one often 
hears the refrain, “if you don’t laugh, you cry.”  
Caring for patients who are at the end of their lives is complicated and often 
difficult for the nurse, for a variety of reasons. One nurse, interviewed to speak about 
end-of-life care of patients in a study exploring the nurses’ perspective said, “The minute 
we stop crying and stop feeling something over the loss of a human life … , it is time to 
get out of there” (Kirchhoff et al., & Clemmer, 2000, p. 40). However, simply “getting 
out of there” is not necessarily the most desirable or possible, for many reasons. So what 
is the nurse who simultaneously does not feel the full emotional impact as she once did 
yet stays to continue her work to do? There is a dissonance between what is broadly 
expected (and reinforced in the literature) and what actually happens. Perhaps humour is 
the answer, the response that fills the gap. Maybe humour is what happens when you 
realize that you do not feel sad about the loss of a human life—or if you do, the impact is 
so fleeting as to not be worth mentioning, and that is both tragic and ridiculous.  
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Watson (2011), in her article “Gallows Humor in Medicine,” describes a 
physician’s residency in an emergency room where he and two other residents had 
ordered pizza. Their wondering about their order which was late was interrupted by a 
nurse announcing a trauma patient was arriving with no vital signs. They met the young 
patient and immediately recognized him as their delivery boy, shot dead as he delivered 
their food.  
That made them work even harder. A surgeon cracked the kid’s rib cage and 
exposed his heart, but the bullet had torn it open and they couldn’t even stabilize 
him for the OR. After forty minutes of resuscitation they called it: time of death, 
4:00 a.m.” (p. 37) 
It was not long after that they wondered what happened to their pizza. It was outside, 
only steps from the emergency room doors. “They stared at it. Then one of the residents 
made a joke. ‘How much you think we ought to tip him?’” (p. 37). They laughed, and 
then they ate. The doctor who does the retell in Watson’s article asks her if it was wrong 
to make a joke, if it, in some way, was denying the young pizza delivery boy his 
humanity. Watson goes on to examine the reasons we joke, and how they affect not only 
the joke-teller but the culture they are encouraging. I am curious about how we use 
humour, how it has the potential to turn tragedy into comedy, and also how it has the 
power to give or take away humanity. Lyrics from Bruce Cockburn come to my mind 
from his song, Lovers in a Dangerous Time, that go, “Got to kick at the darkness ‘til it 
bleeds daylight” (1984). There is an implied cruelty in the kicking, but the result is 
light—what does that mean for the nurse who finds humour in death work? 
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The grandest liminal space 
When I am able to set aside my outrage with the way we look after the dying, the 
dead, tolerating the family’s perception that their loved one may recover if only we carry 
on and behave as though they will, I have grown to understand that perhaps the real 
problem is fairly straightforward: That we are mortal and that humans are the grandest 
liminal space we know. Bookended by nothingness, our life, the only thing we know, is 
just a short blip before it is all over. There is an unfathomable amount of time before and 
after our existence. And I have come to see this as one reason it is so difficult for families 
to recognize and reckon with the impending loss of their loved ones. The Stone Angel, by 
Margaret Laurence (1964) has the aged Hagar Shipley taken by her son and daughter-in-
law to view a nursing home. She asks a resident, “Do you ever get used to such a place?” 
(p. 112). The resident replies, 
“Do you get used to life?” She says. “can you answer me that? It 
all comes as a surprise. You get your first period, and you’re 
amazed—I can have babies now—such a thing! When the children 
come, you think—Is it mine? Did it come out of me? Who could 
believe it? When you can’t have them anymore, What a shock—
It’s finished—so soon?” (Laurence, 1964, p. 112) 
 Sometimes patients struggle with their breathing tube—it makes them cough and 
choke and they look at me and gesture that they want it out. I reassure them that it is still 
necessary but that we will remove it as soon as possible. I usually end my oft-repeated 
rote words of comfort with the phrase, “This is temporary.” I avoid saying things like, 
“Everything will be okay,” or, “You’re going to be just fine” because I believe these 
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phrases to be disingenuous. I cannot honestly assure someone that they are going to be 
“okay.” Perhaps they will not. However, I can tell them, “This is temporary” with a clear 
conscience, since it is, in every possible way. All of this is temporary. Everything will 
fade eventually. Again, that existential element pervades liminality, highlighting the 
fleeting experience of living.  
This brevity is echoed by Paul Bowles, in his The Sheltering Sky (1949/2005), 
where the two main characters talk about death: 
[Kit] had quite forgotten the August afternoon only a little more than a year ago, 
when they had sat alone out on the grass beneath the maples, watching the 
thunderstorm sweep up the river valley toward them, and death had become the 
topic. And Port had said: “Death is always on the way, but the fact that you don’t 
know when it will arrive seems to take away from the finiteness of life. It’s that 
terrible precision that we hate so much. But because we don’t know, we get to 
think of life as an inexhaustible well. Yet everything happens only a certain 
number of times, and a very small number, really. How many more times will 
you remember a certain afternoon of your childhood, some afternoon that’s so 
deeply a part of your being that you can’t even conceive of your life without it? 
Perhaps four or five times more. Perhaps not even that. How many more times 
will you watch the full moon rise? Perhaps twenty. And yet it all seems 
limitless.” (p. 232) 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION: RAGING AGAINST THE DYING OF THE 
LIGHT OF HUMANITY, OR WHERE TO FROM HERE? 
 In considering the closing of my paper, I have been wondering how I could 
possibly write a conclusion when I do not have one “in real life.” I considered, also, the 
writing I have done prior to this project in the Master of Education program. I wrote on 
Hannah Arendt and technology, and the meaning of the Archimedean point in the context 
of an ICU. I wrote on power and the panopticon, comparing the culture in The Giver by 
Lois Lowry (1993) with the culture of the ICU. These papers prepared me to explore the 
work we do and why, and by writing about my experience, I found I had more to say 
about the things we do. My autoethnography may have begun for the reader with this 
paper, but my memories and reflections have been developing for some time. I am still 
having the same conversations about my work with coworkers, patients, and families, but 
when I do, I approach them using my experience—including the transformative 
experience of reflection. This makes me think of the movie Groundhog Day (Ramis, 
1993). On the surface, Groundhog Day is a comedy about Bill Murray as a weatherman, 
doing a job he sees as repetitive and shallow, dismissing opportunities for a deeper 
connection with his peers and those he interacts with. However, it is an optimistic 
existential story. When trapped in the same day over and over again, he is first surprised, 
then dismayed. He is stuck in an in-between space. He becomes overcome with despair, 
going so far as to commit suicide over and over, only to find himself waking to the same 
song on the alarm clock every single morning. Once he learns that the repeat is a 
blessing, once he stops trying to destroy himself and adjusts his view, he sees something 
new. He practices: tries multiple times to play the right notes on the piano, say better 
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words in a conversation, and saves a falling child from injury (or worse) again and again, 
and the repetition becomes his savior because it’s when he has done it as well as he can 
that he is released from the Sysiphisian torment and moves on into the future. This is 
where the movie is so much more than a comedy. He takes the Camus lens, where he 
imagines himself happy. He does not lose his cynicism, he is not a “changed man,” he 
even keeps his dry, jerky sense of humour. However, he chooses to see the goodness that 
was there all along, levering the potential from time and learning. I am perhaps like Bill 
Murray’s character, moving through the same paths and the same conversations, but 
maybe I can do it better this time, play the notes that make harmony. I will again evoke 
the commencement address by David Foster Wallace (2005), because I feel it to be in line 
with what I have learned: 
If you're automatically sure that you know what reality is and who and 
what is really important - if you want to operate on your default setting - 
then you, like me, will not consider possibilities that aren't pointless and 
annoying. But if you've really learned how to think, how to pay attention, 
then you will know you have other options. It will be within your power to 
experience a crowded, loud, slow, consumer-hell-type situation as not only 
meaningful but sacred, on fire with the same force that lit the stars - 
compassion, love, the sub-surface unity of all things. Not that that mystical 
stuff's necessarily true: the only thing that's capital-T True is that you get 
to decide how you're going to try to see it. You get to consciously decide 
what has meaning and what doesn't. You get to decide what to worship. 
(para 9) 
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One of the unexpected consequences of writing this paper over what has felt like 
an extended period of time (approximately two years) has been to reflect daily and deeply 
on the nature of my job and what we do. I have explored the water in which I swim, but 
now, rather than seeing myself alone with my fellow nurses, I acknowledge that the 
patients and their families are here too, in the halocline—the mix of broiling salt and 
fresh water—and are similarly at odds with the situation, albeit for very different reasons. 
Liminal spaces are filled with machinations that are constructed by all parties, so I can 
add my piece: To be liminal does not mean to be insignificant, and if I may be liminal, 
and if we are in the water together, I can cast out a rope—a guide—to move through this 
process in tandem. That is not to suggest that I pull, or commandeer where my coworkers 
or patients or families go, but that I recognize that we are travelling together, and there is 
consolation in that.  
Through my research for this paper, I have gained much more than knowledge of 
in-between spaces—I have learned how better to articulate what is happening to the 
patient with his or her family as well as about the coming path or paths their loved one 
may be taking, as well as the impact of such traumatic interventions as CPR, 
defibrillation, and intubation. I am more equipped to talk about why we may want to 
avoid such interventions without making the families fret that we will care about their 
loved one less. 
 Conversations about end of life, for nurses, are like shifting the meaning of Dylan 
Thomas’s poem Do Not Go Gentle into That Good Night from raging against imminent 
death to fighting against the dying light of humanity, which we are seeking to preserve 
(both the patients’ and, I have learned, our own). There is an ugliness to the truth of why 
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I wanted to explore what nurses do: I want everyone to know what we do to people. I 
want the reader to look behind the curtain with me, peak under the sheets to view the 
disaster, to join the nurse in the position of having the impossible task of hoping for a 
miracle, a panacea. I want people to know that we tend to disintegrating bodies for no 
other purpose than to allow people to grapple with their discomfort with death. Like 
Orwell’s (1946/2013) Politics and the English Language, I want to confront the 
ambiguity in liminality that feels like it holds us hostage in this situation, allowing 
disastrous euphemisms or phrases like “moral distress” to inadequately describe what we 
think about what we are doing. Certainly it is not always the case, but too often the nurse 
is not caring for the living. We are tending the dying in the same way that bombing and 
obliterating cities is called “pacification.” 
The nurse dwells within and reckons with ambiguity and, maybe because of this, 
comes to some understanding about how to manage knowledge of the limit of one’s life. 
Being witness to the liminal space of an ICU, we grow impatient with families who have 
not yet acknowledged the “terrible precision” with which they may be faced: the horizon 
of their loved one’s time alive. It is an event of terror and grief for them, but the nurses 
have accepted it before it is even over. It is not our loss, not our pain. Nor can it be. A 
code blue is called, elsewhere in the hospital, and two of our staff respond by hurrying to 
the ward. In charge of the unit that shift, I arrange to receive the patient, if need be. But 
the nurses return, smiling, throwing their hands up in the air. “Don’t worry!, He died!,” 
they laugh. And I laugh too. Our jobs, for the moment, have been made simpler by not 
having to accommodate another patient, and we are easily able to ignore the fact that it 
was at the cost of someone’s life. We are well aware of our levity being incongruous with 
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the event, but it would be dishonest to suggest that we feel sad. There is no joy found in 
death, but there is also, usually, an absence of grief. Nurses I work with often reflect on 
this, especially after stating something that would, to anyone other than a nurse, seem 
heartless—they joke that they “have no soul.” Even my husband, on seeing me sit at the 
computer writing, once asked cheerily, “Oh, writing about your cold, dead, heart again?” 
which makes me laugh and feel better. But better about what? I think it is because I 
suspect that I do have a cold, dead heart that having someone, my partner, who does not 
believe it to be true behaves like a salve. By voicing something that is actually a belief—
a fear—of mine, he was naming the darkness that let in the light.  
I am simultaneously pragmatic about my own death and sharply, emotionally, 
aware of the many deaths I have witnessed, with the paradox that they all have and lack 
meaning for me. I inhabit liminal spaces, but perhaps liminal spaces inhabit me as well. 
Some sense of my self is anchored by the acknowledgement of paradox and humour like 
Yossarian, facing the tragic absurdity of death—particularly deaths that we “do” to each 
other as humans. I am encouraged by the idea—the hope—that conversations may yield 
change.  
And yet I still suspect part of me is dead inside, and that is okay. I know too 
much, and cannot make it not so. I and my fellow nurses are caught in the midst of our 
halocline, trying to make sense of the roiling mix of differences. It is challenging to 
navigate this collision of experiences, seeing the water but seldom having clarity due to 
the ever-shifting flux of this liminal space. However, by examining the hospital space and 
the ICU within it, and comparing these with literature—both fictional and academic—I 
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may have found my axe, as Franz Kafka (1959/2013) describes the effect of a devastating 
book, for the frozen sea inside myself. 
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